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On October 5, 1977, President Carter signed the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, I and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2 On that day, the Presi-
dent promised to promptly transmit the two treaties to the Senate
for ratification. In so doing, he drew a parallel between the "lofty
standard of liberty and equality" embodied in the American Declara-
tion of Independence and the principles of international human rights
reflected in the United Nations Charter. 3 He then described the im-
portance of the Covenants:
The covenants that I signed today are unusual in the world of inter-
national politics and diplomacy. They say absolutely nothing about
powerful governments or military alliances or the privileges and
immunities of statesmen and high officials. Instead, they are con-
cerned about the rights of individual human beings and the duties
of governments to the people they are created to serve-the rights
of human beings and the duties of government.
• o I •
It would be idle to pretend that these two covenants themselves
reflect the world as it is. But to those who believe that instruments
of this kind are futile, I would suggest that there are powerful lessons
to be learned in the history of my own country.
Our Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights ex-
pressed a lofty standard of liberty and equality. But in practice,
these rights were enjoyed only by a very small segment of our people.
In the years and decades that followed, those who struggled for
universal suffrage, those who struggled for the abolition of slavery,
those who struggled for women's rights, those who struggled for ra-
cial equality, in spite of discouragement and personal danger, drew
their own inspiration from these two great documents-the Declara-
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights].
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force March
23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
3. Remarks on Signing International Covenants on Human Rights, 13 WEEKLY
COMP. oF PREs. Doc. 1488, 1488-89 (Oct. 5, 1977).
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tion of Independence, the Bill of Rights and our own Constitution.
Because the beliefs expressed in these documents were at the heart
of what we Americans most valued about ourselves, they created a
momentum toward the realization of the hopes that they offered.
My hope and my belief is that the international covenants that
I sign today can play a similar role in the advancement and the
ultimate realization of human rights in the world at large.'
Four months later, on February 23, 1978, President Carter sub-
mitted the two Human Rights Covenants, along with two other treat-
ies pertaining to human rights, 5 to the Senate for its advice and
consent. In a letter accompanying the four treaties,' the President
recommended a series of reservations and understandings as to the
Covenants.7 These proposed limitations substantially undermine the
lofty expectations created by the President's earlier pledge to work
for prompt ratification.
This Article begins by briefly discussing the background of the
Covenants and the reasons why United States citizens should be
interested in their ratification.' Turning next to the reservations and
understandings proposed in President Carter's letter of February 23,
the Article describes the content of the letter' and identifies three
standards against which these reservations can be evaluated-the
United States Constitution," international law," and the response of
other nations. 2 Using these standards, the Article next criticizes the
President's proposals, asserting that the reservations and under-
4. Id. It is interesting to note the similarity between President Carter's views and
those expressed by John Foster Dulles when Dulles was a member of the United States
Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. See Simsarian, United Nations
Action on Human Rights in 1948, 20 DaP'T STATE BuLL. 18, 19 (1949).
5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter cited as Conven-
tion on Racial Discrimination]; American Convention on Human Rights, entered into
force July 18, 1978, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65 (1970), reprinted id-
[1969] Y.B. ON HUMAN RioMS 390 (United Nations), 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1971),
and 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 101 (1970).
6. President's Human Rights Treaty Message to the Senate, 14 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PREs. Doc. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978), reprinted in Four Treaties Pertaining to Human
Rights: Message from the President of the United States, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at I
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Message].
7. The proposed reservations to each of the four treaties are quite similar. This
Article, however, will be limited to the two Human Rights Covenants, because they
establish the most authoritative international consensus as to the meaning of human
rights. See sources cited in note 14 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 14-82 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 83-108 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 109-14 infra.
11. See text accompanying notes 115-24 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 125-38 infra.
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standings in the letter overreach requirements imposed by the Con-
stitution, violate principles of international law, and are more protec-
tive of present domestic practice than the reservations attached by
any other nation. 3
II. WHY SHOULD UNITED STATES CITIZENS BE
INTERESTED IN THE COVENANTS?
Taken together, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (popularly known as the Human Rights Covenants)
constitute the world's most authoritative answer to the question:
"What are human rights?"" The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights establishes an international minimum standard of conduct
for all participating governments, ensuring the rights of self-
determination; 15 legal redress;" equality;'7 life;" liberty;" freedom of
movement;'" fair, public, and speedy trial of criminal charges;' pri-
vacy;21 freedom of expression,2' thought, conscience, and religion;2 '
peaceful assembly;2' freedom of association (including trade union
rights) ;2" family;2 and participation in public affairs; 2 but forbidding
torture; "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;"
2
'
13. See text accompanying notes 139-225 infra.
14. See Jenks, The United Nations Covenants on Human Rights Come to Life,
in RECUEIL D'ETunES DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL, EN HOMMAoE %A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 805,
806-07 (1968). See also CoAurroN FOR A NEw FOREIGN AND MimrARY PoLicy, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COVENArrs: ONE BODY OF RIGHTS 4 (1978); M. MosKowrrz, INTERNATIONAL CON-
CeRN wrrH HUMAN RIGHTs 111 (1976); Newman, Natural Justice, Due Process and the
New International Covenants on Human Rights: Prospectus, PUBm. L. 274, 276 (1967);
Schwelb, Entry into Force of the International Covenants on Human Rights and the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 70 AM.
J. INT'L L. 511, 518 (1976). See generally Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter,
12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129, 134-35 (1977).
15. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 1.
16. Id. art. 2; id. art. 26 (equal protection of law).
17. Id. art. 2, para. 1; id. art. 3.
18. Id. art. 6.
19. Id. art. 9.
20. Id. art. 12.
21. Id. art. 14.
22. Id. art. 17.
23. Id. art. 19.
24. Id. art. 18.
25. Id. art. 21.
26. Id. art. 22.
27. Id. arts. 23, 24.
28. Id. art. 25.
29. Id. art. 7.
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slavery;" arbitrary arrest;' double jeopardy;" and imprisonment for
debt."
By ratifying the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, a government agrees to take steps for the progressive realiza-
tion of the following rights to the full extent of its available re-
sources:N the right to gain a living by work;3 to have safe and healthy
working conditions; 36 to enjoy trade union rights;3 1 to receive social
security;3 to have protection for the family;39 to possess adequate
housing and clothing;" to be free from hunger;' to receive health
care;42 to obtain free public education;3 and to participate in cultural
life, creative activity, and scientific research."
The United Nations began drafting these international agree-
ments immediately after the General Assembly adopted the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights45 on December 10, 1948. Eighteen
30. Id. art. 8.
31. Id. art. 9.
32. Id. art. 14, para. 7.
33. Id. art. 11.
34. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 2.
35. Id. art. 6.
36. Id. art. 7.
37. Id. art. 8, para. 1(b).
38. Id. art. 9.
39. Id. art. 10, para. 2.
40. Id. art. 11.
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 12.
43. Id. arts. 13-14.
44. Id. art. 15.
45. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. 810, at 56 (1948). For a description of the process
of drafting the Covenants, see Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents
on Human Rights, in COMPUSSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEAcE, THE UNrrE
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 38, 101-69 (Eighteenth Report, 1968).
Despite participation in the initial formulation of these major U.N. human rights
instruments, the United States found itself unable to ratify these same instruments,
largely as a result of congressional opposition during the early 1950's. Several members
of Congress, most notably Ohio Senator John W. Bricker, became fearful that the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, entered into
force Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951), and the various U.N. treaty drafts (which
later became the basis for the Human Rights Covenants and the Convention on Racial
Discrimination, supra note 5) might encourage international scrutiny of racial discrim-
ination, and might infringe on prerogatives of the states in the United States federal
system. See 98 CONG. REC. 907-14 (1952) (remarks of Sen. Bricker); Bricker & Webb,
The Bricker Amendment-Treaty Law vs. Domestic Constitutional Law, 29 NoTR
DAME LAW. 529 (1954). See also Hearings on S.J. Res. I and S.J. Res. 43 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Joint Resolution Hearings] (Bricker's attack on the International
Covenants).
As a result of these concerns, a series of proposals, known popularly as the Bricker
Amendment, was introduced to amend the United States Constitution so as to restrict
[Vol. 63:35
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the government from entering into international agreements that might infringe on the
powers of the states or be applicable domestically in courts without implementing
legislation. The various versions of the Bricker Amendment are reproduced in 12 REG.
N.Y. CrrY B.A. 320, 343-46 (1957).
An amended version of the Bricker Amendment failed by a single vote to pass the
Senate in 1954. 100 CONG. REC. 2251 (1954). To secure the defeat of the Amendment,
Secretary of State Dulles was forced to make a commitment that the United States
did "not intend to become a party to any such covenant [on human rights] or present
it as a treaty for consideration by the Senate." See Joint Resolution Hearings, supra
at 825; U.S. DE'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 6318, [1953] U.S. PARTIcIPATION IN THE U.N.
155-56 (Report by the President to the Congress) (compiled in INT'L ORG. & CONF. SER.
111, 115 (1954-57)). Dulles also indicated that the United States would not sign the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, entered into force July 7, 1954, 193
U.N.T.S. 135 (instrument of ratification signed by the President March 22, 1976), nor
would the Eisenhower Administration seek ratification of the Genocide Convention.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE U.N., supra at 156; see Schmidhauser & Berg, The American
Bar Association and the Human Rights Conventions, 38 Soc. RESEARCH 362,401 (1971).
See generally V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY
129-41 (1970); Buergenthal, International Human Rights: U.S. Policy and Priorities,
14 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 613 (1974); Gardner, A Costly Anachronism, 53 A.B.A.J. 907,
910 (1967); Sutherland, Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1325-26
(1952).
The Kennedy Administration attempted to relax the 1953 "Dulles Doctrine,"
submitting three minor human rights conventions to the Senate for approval. However,
only one of these instruments, the Supplementary Convention on Slavery, was eventu-
ally acceded to by the United States. International Protection of Human Rights: The
Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 265-66 (1973) (statement of Prof. Egon
Schwelb, Yale Law School). See generally Human Rights Conventions: Hearings Be-
fore a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Seass.
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights Conventions Hearings]; Del Russo,
International Law of Human Rights: A Pragmatic Approach, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv.
749, 764-66 (1968); MacChesney, Editorial Comment, Should the United States Ratify
the Covenants? A Question of Merits, Not of Constitutional Law, 62 AM. J. INT'L L.
912, 915-17 (1968). The Human Rights Covenants and the Racial Discrimination Con-
vention were not even submitted to the Senate for consideration.
The enactment of domestic civil rights legislation, the announcement of court
decisions to eradicate some of the worst injustices of racial discrimination, the related
decrease in concern for states' rights, and the increasing interest in international
human rights, have considerably improved the climate for ratification of these multi-
lateral treaties. In 1974, the report of Rep. Donald Fraser's Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements listed 29 human rights conventions which the
United States had not ratified, and recommended the ratification of those pending
before the Senate at that time. SUBCOMMrrrEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
MOVEMENTS OF TiE HOUSE Comm. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP 21, 24 (1974).
By 1976, further inroads into the Dulles Doctrine had been made. In January 1976,
the Senate ratified the Inter-American Convention on Granting of Political Rights to
Women, and the U.N. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 122 CONG. REc.
8356-57 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1976). The Genocide Convention may be nearing Senate
ratification now that the American Bar Association has reversed its long-standing
opposition to the treaty. Genocide Convention, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Seass. 48 (1977). See generally Comment, The United
States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 683 (1975).
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years later, on December 16, 1966, the General Assembly unani-
mously adopted the two Human Rights Covenants," along with an
Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant.47 This Optional
Protocol enables individual citizens of ratifying nations to lodge com-
plaints of human rights violations with a Human Rights Committee
established by the Civil and Political Covenant."8
By early 1976, the requisite 35 nations had ratified the two trea-
ties and the necessary ten countries had ratified the Optional Proto-
col, so that they became legally binding on participating nations." As
of September 15, 1978, 54 nations had ratified the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 18 more, including
the United States, had signed but not ratified that treaty." Similarly,
52 governments had ratified the Civil and Political Covenant, while
18 others, including this country, had merely signed the Covenant."
The Optional Protocol had been ratified by twenty nations and
signed by nine more.5 2 The United States, however, has not yet even
signed the Protocol. 3
46. The Covenants were adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, with no
states abstaining and only Portugal and South Africa absent at the time of the vote.
Sohn, supra note 45, at 168-69.
47. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
49, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Optional Protocol].
48. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, arts. 28-34; See Parson,
The Individual Right of Petition: A Study of Methods Used by International Organiza-
tions to Utilize the Individual as a Source of Information on the Violations of Human
Rights, 13 WAYNE L. Rav. 678, 697-98 (1967). See also note 67 infra.
49. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 49; Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 27; Optional Protocol, supra
note 47, art. 9; see Schwelb, supra note 14, at 512.
50. See Human Rights International Instruments: Signatures, Ratifications,
Accessions, etc., 12 (1978), U.N. Doc. ST/HR/4 [hereinafter cited as Human Rights
Ratifications] (extracted and compiled from Multilateral Treaties in Respect of
Which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions: List of Signatures, Rati-
fications, Accessions, etc. as at 31 December 1977, U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.D/11). The
material in this publication has been updated through September 15, 1978, by refer-
ence to unpublished, untitled, and unnumbered working documents of the Office'of
Legal Affairs of the United Nations. These documents will eventually be issued by the
United Nations as an inclusion in the next version of the cited publication.
Of the 54 ratifying nations, thirteen were in Latin America and the Caribbean,
eleven in Eastern Europe, twelve in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia, nine in
Africa, six in the Middle East, and three in Asia. Id. at 2-11.
51. Id. at 12. Of the 52 ratifying nations, thirteen were in Latin America and the
Caribbean, ten in Eastern Europe, twelve in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia,
nine in Africa, six in the Middle East, and two in Asia. Id. at 2-11.
52. Id. at 12. Of the twenty ratifying nations, ten were in Latin America and the
Caribbean, six in Western Europe, and four in Africa. Id. at 2-11.
53. Message, supra note 6, at XV, mentions the Optional Protocol, supra note
47, but does not indicate the intention of the Carter Administration as to its signature
[Vol. 63:35
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Because the Covenants represent an international consensus on
what constitutes basic human rights, any appeal by the United
States government to another government for an end to racial oppres-
sion, 5' for the release of political prisoners, 55 for the cessation of tor-
ture" and political killings,57 or for fair democratic elections,58 can be
or ratification. More recently, the Administration has formulated a position which was
issued in response to inquiries initiated by the author:
The President did not sign the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights because it was considered advisable to proceed first with
the basic commitments with respect to the rights set forth in each of the
Covenants, together with their non-optional implementation provisions. The
question of extending the area of implementation of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights can be addressed at a later stage.
The implementation body under the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Human Rights Committee, came into being only recently. The
Committee's special competence to deal with communications from States
Parties or from individuals rests upon the optional provisions of Article 41
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on the Optional Protocol.
Observation of the manner in which this Committee carries out its important
duties, especially in dealing with state or individual complaints, will be
helpful in determining at some future time whether the U.S. Government
should accept the competence of the Committee in these two areas.
The United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. have both signed and ratified
the two Covenants. France has neither signed nor ratified either of the Cove-
nants. None of the three countries has signed or ratified the Optional Proto-
col.
Letter from Hodding Carter I, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (July
12, 1978) (on file with the author).
54. See, e.g., United States Policy Toward Southern Africa: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1977).
55. See, e.g., HuMAN RIGHTS & AMicAN DwLomAcy: 1975-77, at 35-37, 77 (J.
Buncher, ed. 1977); Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and United States Foreign
Policy, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 278-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights
Legislation]; Address by Assistant Secretary of State Patricia M. Derian to Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights under Law and Div. V of D.C. B. Ass'n (March 16, 1978).
56. See, e.g., Human Righ-ts in Uruguay and Paraguay: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International
Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 110-13 (1976) (statement of Hewson A. Ryan, Dep't of
State); Torture and Oppression in Brazil: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Donald Fraser); J. Buncher, supra note 55,
at 77 (1977); Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal Order, 6
HoFsTA L. Rzv. 269, 290 & n.104 (1978); Human Rights Legislation, supra note 55, at
279,
57. See, e.g., Human Rights in Cambodia: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
International Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) (statement of Richard C. Holbrooke, Dep't of State).
58. See, e.g., The Recent Presidential Election in El Salvador: Implications for
U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on International Organizations
and on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (statement of Charles W. Bray H, Dep't of State); Human
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strengthened by reference to the principles embodied in the Cove-
nants. In addition to addressing those human rights that have figured
prominently in the news during recent years-the rights to be free
from arbitrary arrest, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, and arbitrary deprivation of life-the Covenants also provide
a potentially important source of protection for other rights that have
received less public attention but are of no less concern to people
everywhere. 9
Torture and political imprisonment do not occur in a vacuum;
frequently they happen in a context where related human rights are
being violated. For example, workers denied the right to join a trade
union or a farm family denied the right to earn a livelihood may seek
political redress and become political prisoners as a consequence. If
Americans are serious about helping political prisoners and alleviat-
ing their plight," they must also be sensitive to the interrelationship
of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. In this regard,
the Covenants provide a basis for protecting the entire constellation
of human rights.
The United States, however, cannot credibly appeal to other
nations to cease violations of the two Covenants unless it first will-
ingly subjects its own human rights record to international scrutiny.
Hence, given the significance of the Covenants and the Optional
Protocol in defining and protecting international human rights, it is
important that the United States join the growing number of coun-
tries that have ratified these treaties.6 The United States, moreover,
Rights in North Korea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976) (state-
ment of Oscar V. Armstrong, Dep't of State); Human Rights Legislation, supra note
55, at 234. See also Address by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to
American Bar Association (Feb. 13, 1978); Nordheimer, Dominican Soldiers Halt the
Counting in Presidential Vote, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1978, at 1, col. 6; What Counts
in Santo Domingo, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1978, § A, at 26, cols. 1-3.
59. See President's Remarks to People of Other Nations on Assuming Office, 13
WEEKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Doc. 89 (Jan. 20, 1977). Seegenerally SuscoI ErrrE oN INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HousE Comm. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 95th Cong. 2d
Sess., HUMAN RIoHTS CoNDrrIONs IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. REsPONSE 6-15
(1978); see also Human Rights Legislation, supra note 55, at 254-55; A. Blyberg, Pro-
posals for the Implementation of the Right to Food 3-4 (1977) (unpublished draft);
Civic Participation Division, Agency for International Development, Human Rights
and Economic Development 17 (Dec. 15, 1976) (unpublished report); J. Silverstone,
The Covenants 4 (Oct. 7, 1977) (unpublished Agency for International Development
memorandum).
60. See sources cited in note 55 supra.
61. Human Rights Conventions Hearings, supra note 45, at 99-100 (testimony of
Richard Gardner); MacChesney, International Protection of Human Rights in the
United Nations, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 198, 216 (1952); Newman, Ombudsmen and Human
Rights: The New U.N. Treaty Proposals, 34 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 951, 962 (1967); see M.
[Vol. 63:35
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has relatively little to fear from ratification 2 since its human rights
record, although not unblemished, is relatively good.63 Where the
United States does have problems-for example, in its treatment of
Native Americans 6 -it should welcome international encouragement
to improve the situation, as a way of demonstrating this nation's
impartial concern for human rights everywhere. 5
GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 221-22 (1962); Dillard, Should the
Constitution be Amended to Limit the Treaty Making Power?, 26 S. CAL. L. REV. 347,
373, 384-88 (1953); Shestack & Cohen, International Human Rights: A Role for the
United States, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 681, 689 (1974).
62. Indeed, the United States is already obligated by the United Nations Charter
to respect human rights. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56; Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwith-
standing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [1971] I.C.J. 16, 57 (South Africa
obligated under U.N. Charter to respect human rights); see Schwelb, The Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L
L. 337, 339-48 (1972). The Covenants constitute an authoritative interpretation of the
Human Rights Clauses of the Charter. See Sohn, supra note 45, at 169; Tuttle, Are
the "Human Rights" Conventions Really Objectionable?, 3 INT'L LAW. 385, 394 (1969).
63. See A. White, Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights and Potential United States Domestic Legal Problems 17 (1977) (unpub-
lished memorandum). See also Moskowitz, The Covenants on Human Rights: Basic
Issues of Substance, 53 PRoc. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 230, 230-31 (1959).
By signing the Covenants, the United States accepts the responsibility to refrain
from acts calculated to frustrate the objects of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties 291, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11/Add. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Vienna Convention] (1971) ("A State is obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when. . . it has signed the treaty or
.. . expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty. .. ").
The Helsinki agreement also referred specifically to the Human Rights Covenants:
The United States and the other parties to the Helsinki Agreement stated that they
will "fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agree-
ments in this field, including, inter alia, the International Covenants on Human
Rights, by which they may be bound." Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1975, art. I(a)(VII), reprinted in Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, Part Il" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International
Political and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong. 2d Sess. 119, 124 (1976). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE Hasnou ACCORD (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977). Accordingly, one might contend that
the United States is already bound by the principles enumerated in the Covenants.
Ratification, however, would further clarify the United States' legal obligation to obey
the Covenants.
64. See O'Brien, U.S. Policy toward Native Americans and International Human
Rights 9, 39-41 (Oct. 6-7, 1977) (unpublished memorandum prepared for the Hendricks
Symposium, University of Nebraska). See generally D. BROWN, BURY My HEART AT
WOUNDED KNEE (1970); see also M. GALEY, NORTH AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON THE PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR INDIANS AND INurrs 16:20 (1973); Wolford & Rumpf, U.N.
Covenants: Why We Need Ratification, CLERGY & LAITY CONCERNED (CALC) REP.
November-December 1977, at 3.
65. For example, the ratification of the Covenants might lead to some rethinking
of decisions like Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), which construed the eighth
1978]
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The Covenants not only establish an international minimum
standard of human rights conduct, but also institutionalize that stan-
dard and create international procedures for the implementation of
those rights.6 The Covenants require that the participating govern-
ments report on their implementation of the rights set forth in those
two instruments, thus subjecting themselves to international scrutiny
and questioning. 7 Furthermore. the Optional Protocol to the Civil
amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" to apply only to the
criminal penal process. Id. at 664-71. Article 7 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights would appear to have a broader application, forbidding "torture . . . cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." But see Bitker, Application of the
United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights Within the United States, 21
DE PAUL L. REV. 337, 342-43 (1971). "Although the wording in the Declaration of
Human Rights may sound more inclusive, the phrasing in the Constitution has been
interpreted quite broadly by the Supreme Court." Id. at 342. See also Stoiber, The
Right to Liberty: A Comparison of the European Convention on Human Rights with
the United States Practice, 5 HuMAN RIGHTS 333, 350 (1976).
66. See M. GANJI, supra note 61, at 178-92; Capotorti, The International Mea-
sures of Implementation Included in the Covenants on Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 131, 134-38 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds.
1967) (reporting system); id. at 138-43 (settlement of interstate disputes); id. at 143-
46 (individual petitions under the Optional Protocol). But see MacChesney, supra note
45, at 913-14.
67. Article 16 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 1, and Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2,
establish procedures for states parties to report upon the measures they have taken to
achieve the rights guaranteed by the two treaties. See Procedures for the Implementa-
tion of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/RES/1988(LX) (May 14, 1976); Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights: The Interna-
tional Measures of Implementation, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 827, 838-44 (1968). In addition,
Article 21 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 40,
paragraph (4), of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide for general com-
ments and recommendations based on the country reports.
At first glance, this reporting procedure might appear relatively innocuous, in that
governments might be expected to produce only self-laudatory reports. In studying the
quite similar reporting procedures under Article 9 of the Convention on Racial Discrim-
ination, supra note 5, however, Professor Buergenthal has found that the scrutiny and
cross-examination given these reports can make the reporting procedure a very effec-
tive tool of human rights implementation. Buergenthal, Implementing the U.N. Racial
Convention, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 187, 189, 218-19 (1977). The early experience of the
Human Rights Committee, established under Articles 28 through 34 of the Civil and
Political Covenant, seems to confirm Professor Buergenthal's thesis. See, e.g., Human
Rights Committee Begins Consideration of Yugoslavia's Report, U.N. Press Release
HR/1652, July 27, 1978. See generally New Human Rights Committee, INT'L COMM'N
JuRs. REv., Dec. 1977, at 19; Human Rights Committee Completes Questioning on
Report by Iran on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Press Release HR1 1644, July 20,
1978.
Under Article 41 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states parties may
declare that they accept the competence of the Human Rights Committee to consider
human rights complaints by one country against another. Article 42 provides for concil-
iation of any such disputes and reports of findings. Only six states, however, have thus
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and Political Covenant provides a means by which individual citizens
can motivate international investigations of human rights infringe-
ments." Since no system of justice is perfect, it is important that
people have recourse to international procedures such as those cre-
ated by the Optional Protocol."
This is a particularly opportune time for the United States to
begin participating actively in the Covenants, because the procedures
for implementing the Covenants are just now being developed. More-
over, unless the United States ratifies the Covenants, a United States
citizen will not be permitted to participate in the Human Rights
Committee" and will thus be unable to participate in the further
definition of international human rights that will necessarily occur as
the Covenants are applied.7 The definition of international human
rights has direct relevance for United States foreign policy because
United States statutes limit aid to governments exhibiting a consis-
tent pattern of violations of "internationally recognized human
rights." Because the Covenants are the most authoritative state-
ment of such rights, it is critical that the United States have a hand
in shaping their further development. 3
In opposition to ratification, it might be argued that by ratifying
far made such a declaration. Human Rights Ratifications, supra note 50, at 4, 8, 10.
The President, in his letter of February 23rd, stated:
Should the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, I intend upon deposit of
United States ratification to make a declaration, pursuant to Article 14
[sic] of the Covenant. By that declaration the United States would recog-
nize the competence of the Human Rights Committee established by Article
28 to receive and consider "communications to the effect that a State Party
claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
Covenant."
Message, supra note 6, at IV. Such a declaration is to be welcomed, although the
President's letter mistakenly referred to Article 14 instead of 41.
68. See Parson, supra note 48; note 67 supra.
69. See Picken, Rights and Freedoms: The International Covenants, MATCHBOX,
Fall 1977, at 6.
70. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 28, para. 2;
International Law Association, Ratification Now, HuMAN RIGHTS, Summer 1978, at 36,
38; Schwelb, supra note 67, at 835-38.
71. See Schwelb, supra note 12, at 518-19.
The United States will also not be able to participate as a member of the working
group that reviews reports of states parties under the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, although the United States government may send an observer to,
and participate in discussions at, the Economic and Social Council itself. See Imple-
mentation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 64
U.N. ESCOR (Agenda Item 5) 19, U.N. Doc. E/L.26 (1978) (Decision E/DEC/1978/10).
72. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(a), 2304(a)(1) (1972). See generally Human
Rights Legislation, supra note 55, at 251, 265-67 & n.116.
73. See Human Rights Legislation, supra note 55, at 237 n.26.
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the Covenants, the United States would lend visible support to a
minimum standard of conduct that is lower than it would find desira-
ble. For example, since the Covenants do not mention the right to
property,74 the United States might be considered to support that
omission by ratification. It is important to first note that to the extent
that the Covenants are less stringent in defining rights than United
States law, they present no risk to the rights of United States citizens,
because of specific provisions in both Covenants. 5 Moreover, while
the Covenants, as presently drafted, embody fewer rights than had
been envisioned by those who initially advocated the International
Bill of Human Rights,7 it is doubtful that the world community will,
in the near future, accept a higher minimum standard. Accordingly,
the United States can best foster the cause of international human
rights by ratifying the Covenants as presently written so as to be in
a better position to urge ratification by other nations and enforce-
ment of the standards contained in the two agreements.7"
Another objection to United States ratification might be that by
acceding to the Covenants, the United States will, in effect, be sanc-
tioning the human rights conduct of a few nations that have ratified
74. The absence of the right to property from the Covenant was early justified
as a recognition that there existed no international consensus on this right. See Hen-
drick, An International Bill of Human Rights, 18 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 195, 205 (1948)
("[Niations will not be willing to enter into a covenant which contains rights whose
definitions vary considerably in different countries."); cf. United Nations Action in the
Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2, at 99-100 (1974) ("No agreement was
reached on . . . whether the right should be included in the . . . Covenant[s].");
Henkin, The United States and the Crisis in Human Rights, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 653,
670-71 (1974) ("If we in the United States and elsewhere have to refine and reorder
our notions of human rights, we must recognize that others may have different expres-
sions for the same values.").
75. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 5, para. 2; Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 2; see Chafee,
Federal and State Powers Under the UN Covenant on Human Rights, 1951 Wis. L.
RFv. 390, 402 & n.24.
76. See H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 92-165
(1945); Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of
December 1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 103,
117-23.
77. For example, the reference in Article 1 of both Covenants to international law
as a limit on the right of a nation and its people to dispose of their natural wealth and
resources creates a more favorable position for U.S. investors abroad than the United
States would probably obtain from the General Assembly today. See Halperin, Human
Rights and Natural Resources, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 770, 776-87 (1968); Hyde,
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 854,
855-64 (1956). See also Martin, Human Rights and World Politics, [1951] Y.B. WORLD
AFFAIRS 37, 37-51; Przetacznik, The Socialist Concept of Protection of Human Rights,
38 Soc. RESEARCH 337, 345-47 (1971).
78. See Human Rights Convention Hearings, supra note 4, at 54-55 (testimony
of Ambassador Goldberg); Gardner, supra note 45, at 908.
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the treaties but nonetheless continue to violate their provisions. For
example, the Soviet Union and several other Soviet bloc countries are
parties to the Covenants,79 yet their human rights record today con-
tinues to be marred by flagrant violations of the principles that the
Covenants embody."0 Far from approving the conduct of these na-
tions, however, the United States government, by ratifying the Cove-
nants, will be gaining a better position from which to complain of
violations by other governments and to seek strict enforcement of the
Covenants."
In short, during the thirtieth anniversary year of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 2 there is no better way for the United
States to celebrate its renewed commitment to the cause of human
rights than to ratify the Human Rights Covenants and the Optional
Protocol.
79. Human Rights Ratifications, supra note 50, at 2-10.
80. See, e.g., Basket III: Implementations of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings
Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vol. III, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19-37 (1977); Religious Persecution in the Soviet Union: Hearings Before the
Subcomms. on International Political and MilitaryAffairs and on International Organ-
izations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE USSR: THEIR TREATMENT AND
CONDITIONS 138-44 (1975).
81. Gardner, supra note 45, at 908; Shestack & Cohen, supra note 61, at 689. But
see Auerbach, Freedom of Movement in International Law and United States Policy,
IN HUMAN MIGRATION: PATTERNS AND PoucIs 317, 327-29 (W. McNeill & R. Adams eds.
1978).
82. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A 810, at 71 (1948), is a United Nations General Assembly
resolution serving as the first step toward an International Bill of Human Rights,
including eventually the two Human Rights Covenants and the Optional Protocol. See
generally P. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS 173-74 (1951); H. LAuTERPACHT,
supra note 76, at 75-82, N. ROBINSON, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 40-47
(1958); Hendrick, Progress Report on Human Rights, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 159, 161-
64 (1948); Hendrick, supra note 74, at 208; MacChesney, supra note 61, at 209; McDou-
gal & Behr, Human Rights and the United Nations, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 613-19
(1964); Schwelb, supra note 14, at 511-12; Schwelb, The International Measures of
Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the
Optional Protocol, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 141, 141-45 (1977).
The Universal Declaration has exercised a profound effect upon the content of the
two Covenants, other international agreements, and national constitutions. See E.
SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 50-55 (1964) (influence of
Universal Declaration); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 516-18 (1973); A. VERDOODT, NAISSANCE Er SIGNIFICATION DE LA DECLA-
RATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HoMME 323-24 (1964); McDougal & Behr, supra,
at 638-39; Schwelb, The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on
International and National Law, 53 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 217 (1959); Whiteman,
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Human Rights Commission, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 918,
919-20 (1968). See also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, preamble, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222.
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III. ORIGIN OF THE PROPOSED RESERVATIONS
The overall approach of President Carter's February 23rd letter
was to some extent presaged when he promised before his election:
"Insofar as they comply with our own Constitution and laws, we
should move toward Senate ratification of several important treaties
drafted in the United Nations for the protection of human rights.""
Few observers noted the importance of that qualifying phrase, how-
ever, until the new Carter Administration began to consider a so-
called "general reservation" to all human rights treaties that report-
edly would have subordinated all such treaties to the Constitution
and laws of the United States." Opponents of such a general reserva-
tion convincingly argued that such a sweeping reservation would
make ratification meaningless, and would harm the cause of human
rights." Had the United States asserted such a general reservation,
it would have been announcing, in effect, that the human rights
treaties involved no binding obligations. It would also have encour-
aged other countries to assert similar sweeping, destructive reserva-
tions. Although opponents of the general reservation succeeded in
convincing the Administration to drop the idea, the February 23rd
letter bears the same approach in somewhat greater detail.
The President's letter transmitted two detailed documents
signed by Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, dated De-
cember 17, 1977.11 The Christopher documents first summarized the
provisions of the two Human Rights Covenants, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
83. Address by Jimmy Carter, B'nai B'rith Convention (Sept. 8, 1976) (emphasis
added) (reference to Genocide Convention, inter alia). President Carter did not men-
tion this general reservation when he promised, at the United Nations, to sign and seek
congressional approval of the Covenants. The President's Address to the General As-
sembly, 13 WEEKLY COMP. op PRES. Doc. 397, 401 (March 17, 1977) (describing U.S.
commitment to fundamental human affairs as more than "a political posture," and
promising that "[t]o demonstrate this commitment, I will seek congressional ap-
proval and sign the U.N. covenants on economic ... and political rights.").
84. Interview with Roger Cochetti, United Nations Association in Washington,
D.C. (Aug. 15, 1978). See Marcus-Helmons, L'article 64 de la Convention de Rome
ou Les Rtserves a la Convention Europ~enne des Droits de L'Homme, 45 REVUE DE
DROrT INTERNATIONAL ET DE Daorr COMPARE 7, 15-18 (1968).
85. Id.; see J. Hehir, Statement of Preference for Specific over General Reserva-
tions to the U.N. Human Rights Treaties (Oct. 4, 1977) (unpublished memorandum);
P. Rengel, Response to Statement of Preference for Specific over General Reservations
to the U.N. Human Rights Treaties (Oct. 28, 1977) (unpublished memorandum).
86. See Message, supra note 6, at V-XXIII. "Letter" and "message" are used
interchangeably in this Article to refer to both the President's letter and the accompa-
nying Department of State documents.
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tion,87 and the American Convention on Human Rights.8 Then, on
behalf of the Departments of State and Justice, Deputy Secretary
Christopher recommended to the Senate89 a series of reservations,
declarations, and understandings to each of the four human rights
treaties. The overall approach of these documents may be best ex-
emplified by the following paragraph in the President's message:
87. Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 5.
88. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5. See also D. Fox,
Report to Council Meeting, American Bar Association, Section of International Law
(April 28-29, 1978) (unpublished memorandum); 0. Garibaldi, Report on the Proposed
Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations to the American Convention on
Human Rights (April 12, 1978) (unpublished memorandum to American Society of
International Law, Working Group on Ratification of Human Rights Conventions).
89. The Constitution does not explicitly authorize the Senate to formulate reser-
vations to treaties. Article II, section two, clause two of the Constitution merely states
that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." The
Senate has, however, from the earliest days of the Constitution, adopted a practice of
advising the President as to which treaty terms it will consent. See Henkin, The Treaty
Makers and the Law Makers: The Niagara Reservation, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1151, 1176
& n.39 (1956). That practice has matured into a right of the Senate to "advise"
amendments or to make acceptance conditional upon the acceptance of reservations.
See Hayer v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869); Wright, Amendments and Reserva-
tions to the Treaty, 4 MINN. L. REv. 14, 14-15 (1919). See generally C. BUTLER, THE
TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 381 & n.5 (1902); Laws and Practices
Concerning the Conclusion of Treaties, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/3 (1952). This lat-
ter source states,
It is the position of the Government of the United States that if the Congress
of the United States of America (or the legislative body of another country)
has seen fit to include a condition and reservation in the enabling law by
which the Executive is empowered to accept membership in an international
organization established pursuant to international agreement, the Executive
must take cognizance of that condition and reservation in his execution of
the instrument of acceptance. Inclusion of the condition and reservation in
the instrument of acceptance will constitute official notice to the other gov-
ernments concerned with respect to the legislative restriction upon United
States action. The ultimate decision with respect to the question of the
completeness of an acceptance of the constitution of such an international
organization will be made by other governments parties to that constitution
rather than by officials of the organization concerned. Failure of other gov-
ernments concerned to question the adequacy of the instrument is usually
taken as tacit consent.
Id. at 131. The subsequent steps of the United States procedure for the ratification of
a treaty are set out in 14 M. WmTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 7, at 46 (1970).
90. 14 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 89, § 17, at 137-38, provides basic definitions of
the terms "reservation," "understanding," "declaration," and "statement":
The term "reservation" in treaty making, according to general interna-
tional usage, means a formal declaration by a State, when signing, ratifying,
or adhering to a treaty, which modifies or limits the substantive effect of one
or more of the treaty provisions as between the reserving State and other
States party to the treaty. ...
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In view of the large number of States concerned and the dispar-
ity of view on some questions, it was not possible to negotiate treat-
ies which were in perfect accord with the United States Constitution
and law. The treaties contain a small number of provisions which
are or appear to be in conflict with United States law. The most
serious examples are paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 4 of the Con-
vention on Racial Discrimination, and Article 20 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which conflict with the right of free
speech as protected by the Constitution. Reservations to these and
other provisions, . . . along with a number of statements of under-
standing, are designed to harmonize the treaties with existing provi-
sions of domestic law. In addition, declarations that the treaties are
not self-executing are recommended. With such declarations, the
substantive provisions of the treaties would not of themselves be-
come effective as domestic law. The Department of Justice is of the
view that, with these reservations, declarations and understandings,
there are no constitutional or other legal objections to United States
ratification of the treaties."
IV. THE CONTENT OF THE FEBRUARY 23rd MESSAGE
The February 23rd letter contains a number of reservations ap-
plicable to both Covenants. As indicated by the paragraph quoted
above, the most serious problem for United States ratification of the
Covenants concerns a possible conflict with the Freedom of Speech
Clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.'
2
To address this problem, the February 23rd letter proposes a reserva-
tion on that point as to both Covenants. The letter also proposes a
declaration that would attempt to avoid expropriations of foreign
investments, thus limiting the right of all people to utilize their na-
tional wealth and resources, by asserting that this right could only
be exercised in accordance with international law. 3 One of the most
significant of the proposed reservations would limit the effect the
Covenants will have on state governments within the United States."
The term "understanding" is often used to designate a statement when
it is not intended to modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty in its
international operation but is intended merely to clarify or explain or to deal
with some matter incidental to the operation of the treaty in a manner other
than as a substantive reservation. ...
The terms "declaration" and "statement" are used most often when it
is considered essential or desirable to give notice of certain matters of policy
or principle, without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights
or obligations stipulated in the treaty.
91. Message, supra note 6, at VI.
92. U.S. CONST. amend I, cl. 2; see Message, supra note 6, at X-XII; text accom-
panying notes 141-52 infra.
93. See Message, supra note 6, at IX. See also note 77, supra.




Finally, the February 23rd letter and related documents express an
understanding as to both treaties that they will not be implemented
directly by United States courts, but will require legislative action
before becoming enforceable . 5
In addition to the reservations applicable to both Covenants, the
February 23rd message proposes a series of reservations applicable
only to the Civil and Political Covenant. For example, the letter
proposes a reservation permitting the United States to impose capital
punishment." A reservation is also proposed to permit the imposition
of a harsher penalty for an offense, even if the legislature enacts a
lighter penalty after the offense was committed. 7 Further, the Presi-
dent's letter recommends a reservation limiting the effect of Article
9, paragraph (5), of the Covenant, which would have assured compen-
sation to anyone who is unlawfully arrested." Similarly, the message
proposes a limitation, by way of an understanding, on the Covenant's
prohibition against double jeopardy, allowing the federal government
to prosecute persons acquitted in state courts and giving state courts
the right to retry former federal defendants."
The February 23rd message also contains a series of detailed
recommendations on those parts of the Civil and Political Covenant
addressing the treatment of persons accused of criminal conduct. For
example, the message recommends a statement about Article 10 that
would permit the United States to progressively, rather than immedi-
ately, achieve the separation in prison of accused individuals from
convicted persons, and the separation of adults from juveniles.10 An-
95. See Message, supra note 6, at XI, XV; text accompanying notes 176-207
infra.
96. Message, supra note 6, at XII; see text accompanying notes 208-210 infra.
97. Message, supra note 6, at XII; see text accompanying notes 211-14 infra.
98. Message, supra note 6, at XII; see text accompanying notes 215-17 infra.
99. Message, supra note 6, at XIII; see text accompanying notes 218-25 infra.
100. Message, supra note 6, at XII.
U.S. Courts have held that juveniles cannot be commingled with adult prisoners
under the strictures of the fourth, fifth, and eighth amendments, as well as under the
juvenile's right to treatment. See, e.g., Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1352 (6th Cir.
1974); Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1975); White v. Reid, 126
F. Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1954) (by implication).
Nevertheless, such commingling of adults and juveniles-even juveniles who are
awaiting trial-apparently remains a problem in the United States. See NATIONAL
ADvISoRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS 183-84, 191-92 (1973); Shanger, Juvenile Institutional Litigation: The Past,
Present, and Future, 1 PRISON L. MoNrrOR 15 (June 1978). The President's message
apparently takes the ratification of the Covenants as the occasion for seeing that
separate facilities are provided for juveniles.
Similarly, for adult offenders, many jurisdictions have only one detention facility
for both sentenced prisoners and pre-trial detainees. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS & GoALs: CORRECTIONS 134 (1973). In 1973 the Advi-
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other understanding is recommended that would permit the United
States to avoid providing an attorney for a financially able accused
or for one charged with a minor offense."0' Yet another would allow
the United States to require an indigent defendant to make a showing
that a witness is necessary before his attendance will be compelled. "
sory Commission on Criminal Justice recommended: "Persons awaiting trial should be
kept separate and apart from convicted and sentenced offenders." Id. at 133.
101. Message, supra note 6, at XlII. President Carter's "understanding" of the
Covenant's right-to-counsel clause in Article 14, paragraph 3, seems to reflect the
present status of the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision. In Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the sixth and fourteenth
amendments require the states to provide appointed counsel to all indigent defendants
upon whom a sentence of imprisonment will probably be imposed. Lower federal courts
have since expanded on the holding of Argersinger, requiring the appointment of coun-
sel to indigents where the maximum penalty for an offense is imprisonment, even
though the petitioner received no more than a fine for a misdemeanor conviction. Potts
v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Savage, 513 F.2d 536, 537 (5th
Cir. 1975) (dictum); Geehring v. Municipal Court, 357 F. Supp. 79, 82 (N.D. Ohio
1973). Despite expressions of concern to the contrary, see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. at 48-52 (Powell, J., concurring in result), courts have not taken the step of
mandating the provision of counsel in any criminal prosecution, whether involving
imprisonment or merely some stigma of "moral turpitude." Although several judges
and commentators have suggested that such a step is necessary, see, e.g., James v.
Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 334-35 (5th Cir. 1969). See generally Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 682 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misde-
meanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 711-12 (1968), post-Argersinger courts have
generally adhered to the imprisonment standard. See, e.g., Wright v. Town of Wood,
407 U.S. 918 (1972); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977); Rich-
mond Black Police Officers v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123, 128 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1394 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1976); Potts v. Estelle,
529 F.2d 450, 453-55 (5th Cir. 1976); Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713, 715-16 (10th
Cir. 1972). But see Wood v. Superintendent, 355 F. Supp. 338, 344 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(balancing test should be applied case by case for petty offenses).
102. Message, supra note 6, at XIII.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b) provides that for defendants unable to pay:
The court shall order at any time that a subpoena be issued for service on a
named witness upon an ex parte application of a defendant upon a satisfac-
tory showing that the defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of the
witness and that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate
defense.
The application of this rule to a given defendant raises a substantial equal protection
question, i.e., whether the requirement that the defendant's witness must be
"necessary to an adequate defense" while the prosecution may obtain any witness it
desires is discriminatory.
In Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1969), an indigent defen-
dant squarely raised the issue of equal protection. The defendant argued that the
prosecution could and had obtained all its witnesses while he was unable to do the
same under rule 17(b). The Slawek court denied the petitioner's contention, suggesting
that the issue had been raised and litigated on direct appeal (sub nom. Terlikowski v.
United States, 379 F.2d 501, 507-08 (8th Cir. 1967)). Simultaneously, the court side-
stepped Slawek's argument by restating it in terms only of indigent defendant versus
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In regard to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the February 23rd message proposes two understandings that
seem merely to repeat the substance of Article 2, that the rights
established by that Covenant should be achieved progressively rather
than immediately. 03 The letter also asserts'04 an understanding that
Article 2 does not require foreign economic aid, when it obligates each
Party " 'to take steps,' individually and through international assis-
tance and cooperation, 'to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized' by the Covenant 'by all appropriate means. .. ) "1 05 To
a provision in the Covenant that forbids discrimination on the basis
of "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status,"'00 the letter
rich defendant. 413 F.2d at 960. A cursory analysis of the direct appeal reveals that,
in fact, the argument never was litigated; the Terlikowski court had itself simply relied
on rule 17(b) and cases which reiterated the language of this federal rule.
Slawek and Terlikowski are but two in a line of several cases which merely para-
phrase FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b) instead of directly examining the substantive issue it
raises. See, e.g., United States v. Eskridge, 456 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Morris, 451 F.2d 969, 971 (8th Cir. 1971); Hathcock v. United States, 441 F.2d
197, 199 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 916 (1974). Although these cases recognize that the sixth amend-
ment right to compulsory process is fundamental, they stress that such recognition
does not necessarily include the payment of the expenses of witnesses by the Govern-
ment. See Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 241 (8th Cir. 1961). The right to a
subpoena is not absolute, United States v. Linn, 460 F.2d 1274, 1276 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States ex rel. Laudati v. Ternullo, 423 F. Supp. 1210, 1216 (D.C.N.Y. 1976),
but is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See United States v. Pitts,
569 F.2d 343, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 852 (9th
Cir. 1977); Greenwell v. United States, 317 F.2d 108, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Despite the failure of the circuit courts to address the rule 17(b) equal protection
question, lower federal and state courts have examined related issues which may point
the direction the higher courts could follow. Hence, in Hebel v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 325,
331, 210 N.W.2d 695, 699 (1973), the court held that immunity statutes which provide
the government with the power to compel the testimony of a witness, but which do
not afford a correlative right to the accused, are not violative of the defendant's right
to equal protection. See generally Tatman v. Delaware, 314 A.2d 417, 418 (Del. 1973).
In State v. Wells, 290 N.C. 425, 491-92, 226 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1976), the court issued
an instanter subpoena for the prosecuting witness but refused to exercise the same
power on behalf of an indigent defendant to compel the presence of two alibi witnesses.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that this did not deny equal protection. But
see Davis v. Coiner, 356 F. Supp. 695, 697 (D. W.Va. 1973).
103. See Message, supra note 6, at VII, X.
104. See id. at IX.
105. Id., quoting Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
1, art. 2, para. 1. Such an understanding is probably unnecessary, because Article 2
does not impose an obligation to give aid. See Schwelb, supra note 76, at 110. But see
A. Blyberg, supra note 59.
106. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 2,
para. 2.
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proposes an understanding that would allow the United States to
make distinctions on the basis of citizenship in "appropriate cases
(e.g., ownership of land or of means of communication)."',, Finally,
the message recommends a declaration recognizing the right of prop-
erty and asserting the protection of international law as to property
ownership.' 5
V. STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION
In order to assess the February 23rd message, it is necessary to
establish the standards against which that message and its recom-
mendations will be evaluated: the United States Constitution, inter-
national law, and a comparison with reservations by other nations.
A. THE CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court has stated that a treaty may not infringe
upon the provisions of the United States Constitution.' 9 There is
nothing, however, in the United States Constitution, in international
law, or in the previous practice of the United States that would sup-
port the February 23rd letter insofar as it evidently attempts to pre-
vent any change in other United States laws."' Treaties and federal
statutes are ordinarily considered to possess equal dignity under the
United States Constitution; if they are in conflict, the most recent
107. Message, supra note 6, at IX. See generally Gaffney, Social and Economic
Impacts of Foreign Investment in United States Land, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 377, 392
(1977); Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN.
L. REv. 621, 639, 644, 646, 649-50 (1976).
108. See Message, supra note 6, at IX. See also notes 74 and 77 supra.
109. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957). See also Newhouse, The Constitution and
International Agreements on Unilateral Action Curbing "Peace-Imperiling"
Propaganda, 31 LAW & CorrrEMP. PROB. 506, 518 (1966).
110. In voting for the Covenants, the United States delegate, Patricia Harris,
referred in her final statement only to the Constitution and not to other laws or
practices, and
noted that the United States disagreed with the provisions of the Covenants
relating to permanent sovereignty over natural resources, authorizing une-
qual treatment of non-nationals by the developing countries, and restricting
the freedom of expression. She also pointed out that the Covenants "could
not authorize or sanction any measures in the United States which do not
conform to the clear provisions of the United States Constitution, such as
that protecting freedom of speech, or those defining the established constitu-
tional relationship between the Federal Government and the several States."
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, THE UNITED NATIoNs AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 15-16 (Eighteenth Report 1968).
Reservations may, however, be asserted for the first time at ratification. Vienna
Convention, supra note 63, art. 19, at 291; see Owen, Reservations to Multilateral
Treaties, 38 YALE LJ. 1086, 1096-97, 1114 (1929).
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controls."' Furthermore, under the Supremacy Clause,"' federal
law-including treaties-controls state law if the two conflict."' The
limitations proposed in the February 23rd letter that go beyond the
requirements of the Constitution in protecting domestic law or prac-
tice are therefore unnecessary."'
111. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,
508-09 (1947); Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138, 160
(1934); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720-21 (1893); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-98 (1884) (by implication); The Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871).
112. U.S. CONST. art. VII, para. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
113. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942); United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30,40 (1931);
Hauenstein v. Lynhaum, 100 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1880); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 38, 52 (1852); Orr v. Hodgson, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 453, 463 (1819); Chirac v.
Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 270 (1817); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 627 (1813); Higginson v. Mein, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 415, 419 (1808);
Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454, 458 (1806); Clerke v. Harwood, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
342, 343 (1797); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244, 277 (1796); State v. Brails-
ford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 304 (1794). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay) at
436-38 (J. Cooke, 1961); Hartman, Federation as a Limitation on the Treaty Power of
the United States, West Germany, and India, 18 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 134, 154-55
(1966); Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in the Federal
Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281-82 (1932).
114. See 0. Garibaldi, supra note 88, at 1. See also J. BRiERLY, THE BASIS OF
OBLIGA1ONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 176, 180 (1958).
While the reservations, understandings, declarations, and statements proposed by
the February 23rd message are far more extensive and numerous than necessary, that
letter does observe that with these limitations, "there are no constitutional or other
legal objections to United States ratification of the treaties." Message, supra note 6,
at VI. This statement repudiates State Department Circular 175 of 1955, which pur-
ported to find inherent constitutional impediments to ratification of the Covenants.
U.S. Dep't of State, Dep't Cir. No. 175 at 2 (1955), reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 784
(1956). Such constitutional doubts have long since been laid to rest. See Bitker, The
Constitutionality of International Agreements on Human Rights, 12 SANTA CLARA LAw.
279, 283-90 (1972); Goldberg & Gardner, Time to Act on the Genocide Convention, 56
A.B.A.J. 141, 142-43 (1970); Guggenheim & Defeis, United States Participation in
International Agreements Providing Rights for Women, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1, 22-41
(1976); Henkin, supra note 89, at 905-13; Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties, and
International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1019-32 (1968); MacChesney,
supra note 45, at 915-17; McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World
Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 14 LAw & CoNTamp.
PRoB. 490, 500-04, 515-29 (1949), reprinted in 59 YALE L.J. 60, 72-77, 90-106 (1949);




Since the Covenants represent an international minimum stan-
dard of conduct, a government that wishes to ratify them should be
very reluctant to assert that it is unwilling to abide by this stan-
dard.1 5 A reservation to the Covenants constitutes, in effect, an ad-
mission that the country asserting it not only does not, but appar-
ently cannot, or will not, bring its conduct up to international mini-
mum standards."' For the United States, which has vigorously urged
the assurance of basic human rights in other countries, such an ad-
mission should be embarrassing. Moreover, if the United States in
ratifying the Covenants chooses to condition its acceptance upon a
wide range of exceptions designed to protect its current domestic
practices, other nations will be encouraged to do the same. At the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 50
CoRNELL L.Q. 235, 238-49 (1965). But see Dorsey, Subject Matter Limitations on the
Treaty Power, 4 INT'L LAW. 209, 212-24 (1970); Fleming, Danger to America: The Draft
Covenant on Human Rights (pts. 1-2), 37 A.B.A.J. 739,816 (1951); Hogan, Limitations
on the Treaty Power, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 118, 131-32 (1954); Phillips & Deutsch, Pitfalls
of the Genocide Convention, 56 A.B.A.J. 641, 642 (1970); ABA STANDING COMMITTEE
ON PEACE AND LAW THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, HuMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1967), reprinted in 1 INT'L LAw. 600, 612-16, 623-24 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
The Senate's recent action supporting the ratification of the Inter-American Con-
vention on Granting of Political Rights to Women and the U.N. Convention on the
Political Rights of Women further indicates the demise of any lingering constitutional
doubts about the ratification of multilateral human rights treaties. See 122 CONG. REC.
S356-57 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1976).
115. Professor Lauterpacht, who initially envisioned the Human Rights Cove-
nants as part of the International Bill of Human Rights, strenuously opposed reserva-
tions:
The dignity and effectiveness of the Bill demands that there should be no
room in it for reservations of any kind or description. The Bill of Rights is a
Bill of the fundamental rights of man. The idea of any reservations to them
is, prima facie, objectionable. In view of the numerous provisions of the Bill,
of the large number of signatories, and the necessity-if they are to he legally
effective-of the reservations being assented to by other signatories, the
procedure for making them part of the Bill would be difficult to the point of
becoming unworkable. Moreover, if reservations were to be appended in large
numbers they would lend substance to the charge that governments hope to
contrive to become parties to a basic international enactment without undue
sacrifice.
H. LAUTERPACHT, THE INTR ATIONAL BiL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 389-90 (1950).
Professor Lauterpacht did envision the need for reservation if the Covenants be-
came more detailed than he recommended. He also posited the possibility of transi-
tional, short-term reservations on the federal-state issue and on sex discrimination. Id.
at 390.
116. Cf. Moskowitz, supra note 63, at 230-33 (alleging that adherence to the
Covenants is maintaining the status quo of accepted conduct).
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very least, since treaty reservations are reciprocal," 7 any reservations
asserted by the United States would reduce the obligations under the
Covenants, not only of this country but of other parties as well.
Beyond such considerations, the use of extensive reservations to
minimize the effect of a treaty on the domestic practices of the parties
may contravene established principles of international law. The Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties restates in Article 27 the
fundamental relationship between domestic law and treaty law: "A
party may not invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justifica-
tion for its failure to perform a treaty.""' Although the United States
Government could formally evade this rule by incorporating domestic
law into the treaty by way of reservation, such an attempt would
violate the spirit of Article 27.
Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has held, in
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention,"'
that reservations that undermine the essence of a multilateral treaty
may vitiate any attempted ratification of the treaty. That 1951 opin-
ion came after the Soviet Union and several other governments had
attempted to ratify the Genocide Convention with unilateral reserva-
tions and the General Assembly had sought the International Court's
advice as to their acceptability. The court concluded that reserva-
tions are permissible even in the absence of a treaty article specifi-
117. The effect of a reservation would be to allow other parties to the treaty to
assert the same modifications of the treaty in their relations with the reserving state.
See Vienna Convention supra note 63, art. 21, art. 20, para. 4(b) at 292; Briggs, Reser-
vations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, 93 RECUEIL DES Couns 230, 233, 237-68 (1958); Goldie, The Connally Reserva-
tion: A Shield for an Adversary, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 277, 285-87 (1962); see generally
Sanders, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties Made in the Act of Ratification or
Adherence, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 488, 491 (1939). Although the principal obligations in-
curred by parties to the Covenants are applicable vis-d-vis their own citizens, this re-
ciprocal rights provision might affect the utility of the interstate complaints provision
of Article 41 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, reservations
might make uniform interpretation of the treaties very difficult. See Mendelson,
Reservation to the Constitution of International Organizations, 45 Bmr. Y.B. INT'L L.
137, 149-51, 169-71 (1971). But see Fitzmaurice, Reservations for Multilateral Con-
ventions, 2 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1, 15-16 (1953).
118. Vienna Convention, supra note 63, art. 27, at 293. Similarly, the Permanent
Court of International Justice has stated that "it is a generally accepted principle of
international law that in relations betceen Powers who are contracting Parties to a
treaty the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty." Advi-
sory Opinion on The Greco-Bulgarian "Communities," [1930] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 17,
at 32; see Advisory Opinion on the Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons
of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A.B., No. 44,
at 24; HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (A. Robertson ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as HuMAN RIGHTS IN LAw]. See also [1962] Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N,
252-53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962.
119. [19511 I.C.J. 16.
1978]
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cally permitting them, but in the context of a multilateral human
rights treaty, the
[o]bject and purpose of the Convention limit both the freedom of
making reservations and that of objecting to them. It follows that it
is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of
the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a
State in making the reservation or accession as well as for the ap-
praisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.'2
In other words, a reservation that is inconsistent with the object and
purposes of a multilateral treaty is improper. Although the Court
stated that its opinion was "necessarily and strictly limited"'2 ' to the
Genocide Convention, the same considerations would appear applica-
ble to the Human Rights Covenants. 122 This Article suggests that
several of the proposed reservations of February 23rd conflict with the
minimum standards of international human rights conduct estab-
lished by the Covenants and may thus be objectionable. 12 Although
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Both the Covenants and the Genocide Convention are multilateral treaties
dealing principally with a minimum human rights standard for governments vis-d-vis
individuals. See also Comment, The International Human Rights Treaties: Some
Problems of Policy and Interpretation, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 886, 924-25 (1978).
123. The traditional rule has been to forbid reservations to multilateral treaties
unless the reservations are accepted by all the parties to the treaty. See Mendelson,
supra note 117, at 141. See also T. BUERGEFrHAL, LAW MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 24-25 (1969); J. HOLLOWAY, LES RESERVES DANS LES
TRAITES INTEIINATIONAUX 112-22 (1958); F. WILcox, THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CONVErNIONS 47-56 (1935); Sanders, supra note 117, at 499. During the post-World War
II period, however, this "unanimity rule" has been eroded, because of a desire to
encourage universal ratification of international instruments and because of pressure
from nations desirous of expressing reservations. Mendelson, supra note 117, at 414-
45. The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention of Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 16, and the later acceptance
of that decision by the International Law Commission in drafting the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, supra note 63, art. 20, at 291-92, confirmed that reserva-
tions to multilateral treaties can be made, if they are not inconsistent with the object
and purpose of the treaties nor objectionable to other parties. Mendelson, supra note
117, at 142-46.
After the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion in the Reservation to
the Genocide Convention case, the General Assembly adopted resolution 598 (Jan. 12,
1952), recommending that all further multilateral treaties be drafted with a provision
relating to the admissibility or nonadmissibility of reservations. 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 20) 84, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952). General Assembly resolution 546 (Feb. 5, 1952),
also recommended that the Covenants include an article on reservations. Id. at 37. See
Mendelson, supra note 117, at 142; Schwelb, The United Kingdom Signs the Cove-
nants on Human Rights, 18 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 457, 459 (1969).
The General Assembly considered a proposal that reservations not incompatible
with the object and purposes of the Covenant concerned be deemed acceptable if no
less than two-thirds of the parties did not object within three months. After discussion,
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it is doubtful that the other parties to the Covenants would object to
the proposed United States reservations, 24 the Reservation to the
Genocide Convention opinion suggests a way of testing their pro-
priety.
C. RESERVATIONS BY OTHER NATIONS
Aside from the United States Constitution and international
law, a third way of testing the proposed reservations in the February
23rd letter would be to compare them with the reservations made by
other governments that have ratified the Covenants.In As of Septem-
however, this proposal was withdrawn. See 6 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (267th mtg.) 85, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR.267 (1952). The result of the withdrawal is unclear, but the better view
is probably that parties may assert reservations consistent with such international law
principles as are set forth in the Reservation to the Genocide Convention opinion,
supra, and the Vienna Convention, supra note 63. See Jenks, supra note 14, at 808;
Schwelb, supra note 76, at 113-14. See also American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 5, art. 75.
Reservations to treaties that establish international enforcement machinery raise
particularly difficult problems. In essence, by expressing such a reservation, a nation
is seeking special treatment which contradicts the principle of sovereign equality
among nations. See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 146-48, 169-70.
If there are objections to the United States reservations, article 20, para. 4(b) of
the Vienna Convention, supra note 63, indicates that the Covenants will not be in force
between the United States and the objecting nation. See note 117 supra. If such a
pattern prevails, the Covenants would be torn asunder by a lack of uniformity in
decisions and by a series of partial or relative members. See Mendelson, supra note
117, at 149-51, 169-71.
124. The Soviet Union and its allies, for example, would be unlikely to object to
the United States reservations because they have long stressed "the indisputable right
of a State to make reservations." Resolutions of the General Assembly Concerning the
Law of Treaties, [1963] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 21, para. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A11963/Add.1. See AcADEMy OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R. INsTITUTE OF
STATE AND LAw, INTERNATIONAL LAw 270 (1961); D. KAPPELER, LEas RESEavEs DANS Ls
TRArrEs INTERNATIONAUX 36-37 (1958); Carey, Implementing Human Rights Conven-
tions-the Soviet View, 53 Ky. L.J. 115, 122 (1964). See also, Mendelson, supra note
117, at 142.
Nations generally abstain from objecting to the reservations of other governments,
in the expectation that this restraint will be reciprocal and will encourage more univer-
sal participation in multilateral treaties. For example, there have not yet been any
objections to the reservations asserted by the states parties to the Covenants. See notes
125-38 infra and accompanying text. In addition, because of inertia and the lack of a
central decision-making forum, and because Article 20 of the Vienna Convention pro-
vides a relatively short one year period in which objections may be made to reserva-
tions, supra note 63, art. 20, at 292, it is unlikely that other nations will object. See
Mendelson, supra note 117, at 148-49; Schroth & Mueller, Racial Discrimination: The
United States and the International Convention, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 171, 195 (1971). But
see Note, The Effect of Objections to Treaty Reservations, 60 YALE L.J. 728, 733 (1951).
125. See C. Ferguson, The International Status of the Covenants on Human
Rights and the Optional Protocol (1977) (unpublished draft). Ferguson describes the
various reservations in great detail, and his description served as the initial basis for
the analysis contained in this section of the Article.
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ber 15, 1978, 54 states had ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, of which 22 had expressed reservations.'26 Simi-
larly, 52 had ratified the Civil and Political Covenant; 24 had as-
serted reservations.'2 Initially, then, it can be observed that about
half the ratifying nations felt no need to make any reservations. Fur-
thermore, most reservations expressed by other nations did not deal
with the domestic application of the treaties, but with the treaties'
application to other countries, for example, refusing to recognize Is-
rael's participation in the treaties."8
To the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant, only 9 of the
54 ratifying nations submitted reservations or understandings that
limited the domestic application of that treaty. None asserted reser-
vations as sweeping and numerous as those proposed by the United
States.' 9 These limited reservations made by other ratifying nations
may easily be summarized. Four countries-Barbados, Madagascar,
Rwanda, and the United Kingdom (as to some of its colonies)-
made reservations as to their financial ability to provide free pri-
mary education. 3 ' Four nations-Barbados, Kenya, Malta, and the
United Kingdom (as to two of its colonies)-made reservations as
to the care they might provide to mothers before and after birth.''
Two nations-Barbados and the United Kingdom (for itself and for
several of its colonies)-expressed reservations as to the principle of
126. Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary-General Performs
Depositary Functions: List of Signatures, Ratifications, Accessions, etc. as at 31 De-
cember 1977, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/11, at 99-104 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Multilateral Treaties]. The material in this publication has been updated through
September 15, 1978, by reference to unpublished, untitled, and unnumbered working
documents of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations. These documents will
eventually be issued by the United Nations as an inclusion in the next version of the
cited publication.
127. Id. at 105-110.
128. The countries making a reservation over the application of the Covenants
to Israel included Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Id. at 102-04, 108.
In addition, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Re-
public, Guinea, Hungary, Mongolia, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic, the Soviet Union, and Syria have filed almost identical reservations as to Article
48 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, and Article 26 of the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, which limit those
nations that may become parties to the Covenants. These reservations note that there
are a few nations that cannot become parties because they are not members of the
United Nations, are not parties to the Statute of the I.C.J., and have not been invited
by the General Assembly. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 126, at 102-04, 106-08.
129. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 126, at 102-04. The United Kingdom sub-
mitted a substantial list of nine reservations and understandings, but almost all con-
cerned the application of the treaty to British colonies. See Schwelb, supra note 123,
at 460-67.




equal pay for equal work. 32 Denmark and Sweden made reservations
as to providing pay for public holidays.'1' And Norway qualified the
right to strike clause by saying that the provision would be inter-
preted as being compatible with the requirement of submitting labor
disputes to the State Wages Board.'
34
By comparison, the February 23rd letter proposes that the
United States assert four understandings, two reservations, one dec-
laration, and one declaration and understanding with respect to
ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.' 35 The most important of these understandings, reservations,
statements, and declarations will be analyzed in the next section of
this Article.
In regard to the Civil and Political Covenant, 11 states out of the
52 that have ratified that treaty expressed domestically-oriented
reservations or statements.' 3' None of those countries asserted
reservations or statements as to more than seven subjects. The re-
spective total number of reservations and understandings by those
eleven nations are as follows: Finland (7), United Kingdom (6) and
its colonies (6), Austria (6), Italy (6), Federal Republic of Germany
(6), Denmark (5), Norway (5), Sweden (3), Guyana (2), Venezuela
(1), and Barbados (1).'11
The February 23rd letter proposes, by comparison, that the
United States assert reservations. as to five subjects, understandings
on four subjects, two declarations, and one statement limiting the
application of the Civil and Political Covenant in this country.' 38
Quantitative comparisons provide only a sketchy impression of
the propriety of the limitations proposed in the February 23rd letter.
A more meaningful impression is obtained by analyzing some of the
important proposed reservations, understandings, declarations, and
statements.
132. Id. at 102, 104.
133. Id. at 102-03.
134. Id. at 103.
135. Message, supra note 6, at VIII-XI.
136. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 126, at 105-10.
137. Id. at 105-10. In addition, Chile and the United Kingdom (for Northern
Ireland) made declarations under Article 4 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 2, that a public emergency existed requiring the derogation of
certain specified rights. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 126, at 106, 109-10. As
to the effectiveness of these later declarations, see Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur.,
Ct. of Human Rights (1978), reprinted in 17 hNT'L LEGAL MATr.LLs 680, 706-09 (1978);
Protection of Human Rights in Chile, 31 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Working Group on the
Situation of Human Rights in Chile, U.N. Doc. A/31/253 (1976).
138. Message, supra note 6, at XI-XV.
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VI. THE PROPOSED RESERVATIONS 39
A. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The February 23rd letter proposes a reservation that would pre-
vent either Covenant from conflicting with the free speech provision
of the United States Constitution's first amendment.' Article 20 of
the Civil and Political Covenant forbids "propaganda for war" and
"advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred."'' In addition, para-
graph (1) of Article 5 in both Covenants contain almost identical
language:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or
freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the present Covenant."2
Because a treaty cannot be ratified if it conflicts with the Consti-
tution, '1 there may well be a need for the United States to express a
reservation with respect to these provisions.' Article 20 of the Civil
and Political Covenant obviously involves a balancing of human
rights values. Advocates of human rights could reasonably differ as
to where one should strike a balance between freedom of speech (pro-
tected by the first amendment of the Constitution' and by the
"freedom of expression" clause of Article 19 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights) ' and freedom from racial hatred.4 ' Five of the
139. From among the substantial number of proposed reservations, understand-
ings, declarations, and statements, this Article selects a few of the most important and
focuses on them as a means of analyzing the over-all approach taken by the February
23rd letter.
140. Message, supra note 6, at X-XII.
141. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 20.
142. Id., art. 5, para. 1; Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights,
supra note 1, art. 5, para. 1.
143. See authorities cited in note 109 supra.
144. See Bitker, supra note 114, at 287-88; MCPL Education Fund, The U.N.
Human Rights Covenants and U.S. Foreign Policy 22 (1978) (unpublished draft by
Members of Congress for Peace Through Law).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
146. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 19, para. 2.
147. The area of conflict between the first amendment and Article 20 can, how-
ever, be so narrowed as to require a much less sweeping reservation than that proposed
by President Carter. See Seeley, Article Twenty of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: First Amendment Comments and Questions, 10 VA. J. INT'L L.
328, 343-45 (1970). See also Newhouse, supra note 109 at 525; Van Alstyne, The First
Amendment and the Suppression of Warmongering Propaganda in the United States:
Comments and Footnotes, 31 LAW & CoNTrzP. PROB. 532, 540-49 (1966). The United
States need only assert a restriction that to the extent the first amendment conflicts
with Article 20, the first amendment would control.
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nations that have ratified the Civil and Political Covenant have also
expressed reservations to Article 20.148
While some reservation may be needed to Article 20 of the Civil
and Political Covenant, however, the February 23rd letter proposes
a sweeping reservation that does not end with solving the first amend-
ment problem, but also unnecessarily limits paragraph (1) of Article
5 in both treaties by referring to the Constitution, laws, and practice
of the United States:
The Constitution of the United States and Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contain provi-
sions for the protection of individual rights, including the right to
free speech, and nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to require
or to authorize legislation or other action by the United States which
would restrict the right of free speech protected by the Constitution,
laws, and practice of the United States."'
At the outset, it is difficult to determine what "laws and prac-
tice" the February 23rd letter is seeking to protect that would not be
amply protected by a simple reference to the first amendment. Be-
yond this, the proposed reservation, which appears aimed at ensuring
greater protection of speech than exists under the Covenants, might
perversely be used to justify United States "laws and practice" that
are less protective of freedom of speech than Article 19 of the Civil
and Political Covenant. For example, the United States Supreme
Court has upheld against first amendment challenge "laws and prac-
tice" that require unpopular political parties to provide a list of their
supporters to the government,5 ' allow police surveillance of peaceful
demonstrations, 151 and forbid unpopular speakers from entering the
United States to give speeches. 5 Since Article 19 could be inter-
preted to prohibit such government interference, the proposed reser-
vation may actually offer less protection for freedom of expression
than the original Covenants.
B. FEDERALISM
Article 28 of the Civil and Political Covenant and Article 50 of
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state, "The
provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal
States without any limitations or exceptions."' 53 The February 23rd
148. Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have ex-
pressed reservations as to Article 20. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 126, at 107-09.
149. Message, supra note 6, at X.
150. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976).
151. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
152. Kleindienst v. Mandel 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
153. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 28; Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 50.
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letter proposes reservations that directly conflict with the language
of Articles 28 and 50, and thus would substantially limit the impact
of the Covenants on state governments within the United States:
The United States shall [progressively' ] implement all the
provisions of the Covenant over whose subject matter the Federal
Government exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction; with re-
spect to the provisions over whose subject matter constituent units
exercise jurisdiction, the Federal Government shall take appropriate
measures, to the end that the competent authorities of the constitu-
ent units may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of this
Covenant.'5
This reservation might be found unacceptable under international
law as vitiating an essential component of the treaty,'6 in which case
a substantial question would arise as to the effectiveness of any
United States ratification that includes such a reservation. Treaties,
particularly bilateral instruments, have traditionally been considered
analogous to contracts between states. ' Under traditional doctrine,
a treaty cannot be valid unless mutually consented to by competent
parties.' s If, in consenting to a treaty, the United States attaches
certain reservations, those reservations are analagous to counter-
offers to a contract and must be accepted by the other parties in order
to form a binding agreement.'59 Accordingly, if one or more of the
reservations interposed by the United States are not accepted by the
other states that are parties to a treaty, or if the reservations are
otherwise considered improper, it might be contended that agree-
ment is lacking and thus that no treaty is formed.'
154. The reservation to Article 50 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, supra note 1, inserts the word "progressively" at this point in the text.
Otherwise the reservations are identical. Compare Message, supra note 6, at X-XI,
with id. at XIV-XV.
155. Id. at XIV.
156. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 359-
64 (1950).
157. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Wright, Validity
of the Proposed Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 20 COLUM. L. RaV. 121, 121-23 (1920)
[hereinafter cited as Peace Treaty]; Wright, supra note 89, at 17.
158. Peace Treaty, supra note 157, at 121.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 38, at 88 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973); Note, supra note 124, at 728-29 & n.3.
160. Modem multilateral treaties, however, partake both of international legisla-
tion and of contract. See Anderson, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions: A Re-
examination, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 450, 477 (1964); Brierly, The Codification of
International Law, 47 MICH. L. REv. 2, 3-4 (1948); Lauterpacht, Report to the Interna-
tional Law Commission on the Law of Treaties, [1953] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 123, 127,
U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1; Owen, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties,
38 YALE L.J. 1086, 1086-87, 1094, 1105 (1929); Sohn, supra note 14, at 135; Note, supra
note 124, at 731-32. Accordingly, traditional contract theories may be insufficient to
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Beyond this potential problem, there is considerable question
about the need for such a reservation. In the early negotiations lead-
ing to the drafting of the Human Rights Covenants and other interna-
tional agreements relating to human rights, the United States at first
insisted upon treaty language that would have exempted the states
from the impact of these treaties."' Later, as the force of states' rights
positions in this country decreased, United States representatives
dropped their insistence upon such a federal-state clause.162 The pro-
posed reservation reasserted this anachronistic concern.
Although there may have been some doubt in the early 1950's as
to the authority of the federal government to legislate in many of the
areas covered by the Covenants,' those doubts have been resolved
largely in favor of federal power.' In view of the civil rights legisla-
tion of the past twenty years,6 5 it is clear that the federal government
explain the consequences of an improper or unaccepted reservation. See Fenwick,
Reservation to Multilateral Conventions, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 122 (1952). Perhaps,
the United States would remain bound by a ratified multilateral treaty even though
some of its reservations are not accepted or otherwise held invalid. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 137, at 503 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962) (Reporters' Note). See also Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and
the President in International Relations-Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25
CALIF. L. REv. 643, 652-53 (1937).
In Power Authority v. Federal Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 543-44 (D.C. Cir.
1957), vacated as moot sub nom. American Power Ass'n v. Power Auth., 355 U.S. 64
(1957), it was suggested that an inoperative reservation will not vitiate the accompany-
ing ratification. The reasoning of that decision, which relies upon New York Indians
v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1898), is subject to considerable question, because
both parties to the treaty in New York Indians proceeded to conduct themselves under
the treaty even though the purported reservation was not fulfilled. See Henkin, supra
note 89, at 1176-81.
161. See M. GAmnJ, supra note 61 at 212-20; Liang, Notes on Legal Questions
Concerning the United Nations, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 108, 121-24 (1951); MaeChesney,
supra note 61, at 218; Simsarian, Progress in Drafting Two Covenants on Human
Rights, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 710, 716-17 (1952). The United States also initially voted
for a federal-state clause in the Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 5.
162. The United States apparently changed its position and voted for the dele-
tion of such clauses. See 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1411th mtg.) 199, U.N. Doe.
A/C.3/SR.' 1411 (1966) (deletion of article 28). See generally Schwelb, supra note 76,
at 127 n.55; Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 996, 1054 n.67 (1966); see also A.B.A.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 114, at 624.
163. See Chafee, supra note 75, at 422-24; Fleming, supra note 114, at 816. See
also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70, 77 (1951).
164. See note 114 supra.
165. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 360i-19, 3631 (1976); 18
U.S.C. § 245(b); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to 2000h-6 (1977);
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § § 1971-1973 (1977); 25 U.S.C. § § 1301-1341
(1977) (constitutional rights of American Indians).
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has the power under the commerce clause, ' as well as the enforce-
ment clauses of the thirteenth,'67 fourteenth, ' and fifteenth amend-
ments 6 ' to legislate in the areas covered by the Covenants. Only
where the federal government attempts to interfere in "integral gov-
ernmental functions of [state] bodies,"'' 0 such as the relations be-
tween a state and its employees, would there now be any question of
federal legislative authority.
Furthermore, if there remains any residual doubt about federal
authority, the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Holland"'
would support the Human Rights Covenants as valid exercises of the
treaty power, even without other basis for federal action.' In
Missouri v. Holland, the Court rejected the argument that "what an
act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers
reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do."' 3 Instead, the Court
noted that under the Constitution "Acts of Congress are the supreme
law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution,
While treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority
of the United States."'' 4 The Court then concluded that since the
treaty did not contravene any express prohibition of the Constitution,
it was not invalid simply because it might infringe on rights otherwise
reserved to the states under the tenth amendment.'75
C. SELF-EXECUTING NATURE OF THE COVENANTS
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to assure not only that treat-
ies are the supreme law of the land, but also that, at least in some
circumstances, they may be considered laws applicable by the courts
without implementing legislation. 17 Accordingly, some treaty provi-
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 302 (1964).
167. U.S. CONsT. amend. XHI, § 2; see, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409, 438-40 (1968).
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259-60 (1964).
169. U.S. CoNST. amend. XV, § 2; see, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
170. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
171. 252 U.S. 416, 432-34 (1920); cf. H. LAUTrERAcHT, supra note 156, at 157-58
(discussing application of Missouri v. Holland to enforcement of the U.N. Charter).
172. See note 114 supra.
173. 252 U.S. at 432.
174. Id. at 433; U.S. CONsT. art. VI, para. 2.
175. 252 U.S. at 434.
176. In Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), the Supreme Court con-
strued the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2, as follows:
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
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sions are considered to have immediate domestic consequences (self-
executing);' 7 while other treaty provisions require legislative action
to carry them into effect (not self-executing)."" Whether or not a
treaty is self-executing-and, therefore, to be treated as law without
the need for legislative action-is initially a question for the Presi-
dent, who is constitutionally obligated to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed."'17 But, while the views of the Executive are
given great weight, the issue has been considered as ultimately one
for the courts, which must determine whether to give the treaty effect
as law without legislative implementation."'
The February 23rd letter, however, attempts to remove this diffi-
cult issue from the courts by asserting a declaration to both treaties
that the Covenants are not self-executing.'81 The effect of this decla-
ration is to deprive American courts of their most potent technique
for contributing meaningfully to the interpretation of the Human
Rights Covenants. 2 If the Covenants are self-executing, litigants
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.
Id. at 314. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141, at 432-
40 (1965), Comments a-f, Reporters' Notes 1-3; Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the
United States of America, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 185 (1954); McLaughlin, The
Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 42 MINN. L. REv. 709, 748-53 (1958);
Sorensen, Obligations of a State Party to a Treaty as Regards its Municipal Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN LAW, supra note 118, at 11, 23.
177. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
178. Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provi-
sions in American Law, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 643, 645 & n.12 (1951); Note, The U.N.
Covenants on Human Rights and the Domestic Law of the United States, 48 B.U.L.
REv. 106, 110 & n.41 (1968).
179. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTrrUTION 158 (1972).
180. See Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 416 (1840);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154, at 471-
75 (1965); HENKIN, supra note 179, at 158.
181. Message, supra note 6, at VIII, XV.
182. See generally A. BLECKMANN, BEGRIFF AND KRITERIEN DER INNERSTAATLICHEN
ANWENDBARKEIT VOLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE 17-41 (1970); L. SOHN & T. BUERGEN-
THAL, REGIONAL CONVENTIONS ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1238-40 (1973); Buer-
genthal, The Domestic Status of the European Convention on Haman Rights: A Sec-
ond Look, 7 J. INT'L CoWn'N Juns. 55, 94-95 (1966); Drzemczewski, The Domestic
Status of the European Convention on Human Rights: New Dimensions, 1977/1 LEGAL
ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 22-65; Preuss, The Execution of Treaty Obligations
Through International Law-Systems of the United States and of Some Other
Countries, 44 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 832, 887-96 (1951); Robertson, The United
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may use these treaties to support their positions.' 83 In furthering
their specific interests, litigants may discover many possible applica-
tions for the Covenants that might otherwise be overlooked by the
slow moving and very rudimentary international enforcement proce-
dures established by the Covenants." 4 With a whole world to watch,
the international procedures can probably be expected to focus only
on the most serious human rights problems. If the Covenants are self-
executing, however, every lawyer in the United States is potentially
a watchdog for human rights.'1 The final result of making the Cove-
nants not self-executing can only be to diminish substantially the
impact of the treaties in the United States.
Beyond this, the propriety and legality of the proposed declara-
tions are at least questionable. Over the years, courts have used, and
commentators have advocated, various standards for determining the
extent to which a treaty ought to be considered self-executing.," For
example, in the much cited opinion of Foster v. Neilson, " Chief
Justice Marshall looked principally at the language of a bilateral
treaty in determining that it was not sufficiently definite and com-
pulsory to be self-executing.' Only four years later, however, Chief
Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 43 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 21, 23 (1970).
183. See, e.g., Saipan v. Department of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1033 (1975); 10 TEX. INT'L L.J. 138, 141 (1975).
184. See F. Newman, How International Human Rights Cases are Won and
Lost-A Guidebook for Lawyers and NGOs 2-4 (July 9, 1977) (unpublished draft).
185. See generally Lillich, The Enforcement of International Human Rights
Norms in Domestic Courts, in J. TUTTLE, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
PRACTICE 105, 105 nn.1 & 2 (1978); Weissbrodt, The Role of International Nongovern-
mental Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 293,
316-17 n.104 (1977); Comment, Public Interest Litigation and United States Foreign
Policy, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 375, 375 n.1, 398 n.86 (1977); Comment, Private Attorneys-
General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE L.J. 574, 595-98 (1949).
186. See L. WILDHABER, TREATY MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUMON 201-02 (1971);
Chafee, Legal Problems of Freedom of Information in the United Nations, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 545, 563 (1949); Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-
Executing Treaties, 1951 Paoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 66, 74; 2 STAN. L. Rav. 797, 806
(1950); 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1247, 1248 (1952).
187. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
188. Id. See also Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker 299 U.S. 5, 10-11
(1936); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721-22 (1952); Evans, Some Aspects of the
Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 45 PRoc. Am. Soc. IN'L L. 66, 74 (1951); Hudson,
Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44 Am. J. INT'L L. 543, 545
(1950); see generally Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Hyman,
Constitutional Aspects of the Covenant, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROs. 451, 468 (1949);
Schluter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations
Charter, 61 CALIF. L. Rv. 110, 116-27, 140-49 (1973); Note, Self-Execution of Treaties
Under the United States Constitution, 26 CoLuM. L. REv. 859, 864-66 (1926); Com-
ment, Treaties-United Nations Charter Invalidates Alien Land Law, 35 MINN. L.
Rav. 333, 337-38 (1951).
[Vol. 63:35
HUMAN RIGHTS
Justice Marshall reversed his conclusion as to the same bilateral
treaty, based upon a review of the history of negotiations indicating
that the parties apparently intended the treaty to be self-executing.'8'
In regard to a multilateral treaty, by contrast, it is doubtful
whether the intent of the parties manifested either at drafting'" or
in ratification"' should serve as the appropriate standard of evalua-
tion. The interest of only a few parties to a multilateral treaty should
not control its self-executing effect."' Professor Riesenfeld has sug-
gested, instead, that a multilateral treaty ought to be deemed self-
executing if it "(a) involves the rights and duties of individuals; (b)
does not cover a subject for which legislative action is required by the
Constitution; and (c) does not leave discretion to the parties in the
application of the particular provision.""' 3
189. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88 (1833). See also United
States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 710-12 (1832).
190. See Schluter, supra note 188, at 128-31. But see Schachter, supra note 178,
at 646-48; J. O'Connell, Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Timing and Mode of Execution 1-2 (Apr. 20, 1978) (unpublished
report on file with the author) (suggesting that preparatory work on the Covenant
constitutes an important source of evidence in determining its mode of execution).
191. Schluter, supra note 188, at 131-32.
192. See id. at 128-31.
During the drafting process, the United States delegation sought to ensure that
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would not be self-executing by supporting
language in Article 2 that would have required parties to adopt legislation or other
measures within a reasonable time. The delegation also insisted upon a footnote in the
Drafting Committee Report that the Covenant is not self-operative. See 17 U.N.
GAOR, C.3 (1182nd mtg.) 239, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1182 (1962). The "within
a reasonable time" language was eventually deleted because it would have postponed,
perhaps indefinitely, the obligations prescribed in the Covenant. See Schwelb, The
Nature of the Obligations of the States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 1 PROBLEMES DE PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME, 301, 316-17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Obligations]. See also Hendrick,
An International Bill of Human Rights, 18 DEPr. ST. BULL. 195, 206 (1948); Mac-
Chesney, International Protection of Human Rights in the United Nations, 47 Nw.
U.L. REV. 198, 217 (1952).
The Drafting Committee also failed to state that the Covenant was not self-
executing. Instead, the Report indicated only that the Committee had "agreed to point
out in its Report its view that the Covenant is not self-executing." Obligations, supra,
at 314. It is not at all clear that the inserted footnote expresses the intent of the
Covenant, rather than a concession to the insistence of one delegation. Obligations,
supra, at 316-17. Indeed, U.S. courts have found clauses in treaties to be self-executing
even when it was contemplated that entire additional treaties would be prepared to
elaborate a clause. Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights
Provisions in American Law, 4 VAw. L. REv. 643, 654 & nn.60-61 (1951).
193. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Notable
German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 550 (1971); see Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of
Self-Executing Treaties and Community Law: A Pioneer Decision of the Court of
Justice of the European Community, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 504, 507 (1973); Riesenfeld,
supra note 160, at 649-51.
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Applying this approach, it is possible to discern from the lan-
guage of the two Covenants a marked difference in their immediacy
of application. ' Article 2 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights sets forth the obligation of each
party "to take steps. . . to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, includ-
ing particularly the adoption of legislative measures."'' 5 This condi-
tional, "progressive" language may be contrasted with the far more
direct words of Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights that clearly establishes an immediate obligation for
all parties to the Civil and Political Covenant:'
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, with-
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional pro-
cesses and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect
to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."'
But it is not clear whether this Covenant is self-executing or, instead,
requires only that the ratifying governments promptly enact imple-
menting legislation."8 Article 2, when read together with the substan-
tive provisions of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, meets
at least the first two of Professor Riesenfeld's three standards. It both
concerns the rights of individuals199 and does not constitutionally
require legislative implementation, 210 as would a provision calling for
194. See Schwelb, supra note 76, at 107-10.
195. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 1, art. 2,
para. 1.
196. See Obligations, supra note 192, at 314-17; see also Jenks, supra note 14, at
812.
197. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 2, paras. 1-2.
198. See Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the European Convention on Human Rights, 43 BRrr. Y.B. INr'L L. 21, 25-26
(1970); Simsarian, Progress in Drafting Two Covenants on Human Rights in the
United Nations, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 710, 715 (1952).
199. See text accompanying note 193, supra; Schluter, supra note 188, at 149-
51. See, e.g., United States V. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 108-09 (1801).
200. See note 178 supra; Schluter, supra note 188, at 132-35.
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an exercise of the spending power"0 ' or the imposition of some crimi-
nal sanction."0
The language of paragraph (1) of Article 2 seems to impose an
immediate obligation. Paragraph (2) requires a government to "take
the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional process...
to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.""2 3 Since
paragraph (2) expressly refers to legislative action, a question is
raised as to whether legislation thus becomes the sole means of fulfill-
ing the government's obligation under the treaty. Article 2, however,
also refers to "other measures" "in accordance with" a state's "con-
stitutional processes." Court action could be one of these "other
measures."204
Many of the individual operative clauses of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights are also phrased in the language of immedi-
ately effective obligation. For example, there would be no need for
legislation to implement Article 11, which provides, "No one shall be
imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual
obligation." ' 5 Other clauses may be less clear in demanding immedi-
ate judicial enforcement. '
Because much of the language in the Covenants denotes self-
execution, and because self-execution provides an effective means of
enforcement, it is improper for the United States to assert a declara-
tion that categorically denies that effect. Just as United States courts
have examined each article of the United Nations Charter separately
to determine its self-executing effect, 0 7 so too should the courts be
201. See Note, supra note 188, at 866-67.
202. See Henry, When is a Treaty Self-Executing?, 27 MicH. L. REv. 776, 782
(1929).
203. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 2.
204. See Schluter, supra note 188, at 152-62.
205. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 11.
206. For example, the first clause of Article 8, para. 1, clearly requires no further
legislative action: "No one shall be held in slavery; . . . ." Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 8, para. 1. The second clause, however, insofar as
it calls for criminal sanctions, would presumably require legislative confirmation:
"[Silavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be prohibited." Id. art. 8, para.
1; see Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in
American Law, 4 VAND. L. REv. 643, 644-46 & n.11 (1951).
207. See, e.g. Aquilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738 (1943) (concurring
opinion) (Article 2, para. 1, self-executing); Saipan v. Department of Interior, 502 F.2d
90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974) (Article 73, self-executing); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1974) (Article 2, para. 4, self-executing); Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d
838, 843 (2d Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion) (Articles 87 and 88, self-executing); United
States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (Article 105, not self-
executing); cf. Keeney v. United States, 218 F.2d 843, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Articles
100 and 105, self-executing).
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allowed to consider each Article of the Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights.
D. CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT
Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
abolish capital punishment, but it does forbid the death penalty for
youths under 18 years of age and for pregnant women, and also as-
sures that pardon may be available in all death penalty cases and
that the death penalty may be imposed only for the "most serious
crimes."s
The February 23rd letter proposes a reservation to Article 6 that
would preserve the right of the United States to impose capital pun-
ishment on any person, including children and pregnant women,
without the availability of pardon, and for insignificant crimes: "The
United States reserves the right to impose capital punishment on any
person duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the
imposition of capital punishment." '' A few states may have provi-
sions that would be affected by Article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,21' but in asserting this reservation, the February 23rd
208. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 6, paras. 2-5.
209. Message, supra note 6, at XII.
210. Of the thirty-two states that have laws imposing capital punishment, as of
November 1, 1978, sixteen have legislation staying the execution of a pregnant woman
until after the birth of her child. See ALA. ConE tit. 15, § 15-18-86 (1975); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-2622 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3705-3706 (West, 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
922.08 (West, 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 27.1520 (1978); IDAHO CODE 99 19-2713 to -2714
(1948); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-1-46-20 to -22 (Burns, 1975); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
431.240 (Baldwin, Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75(b) (1976 & Supp. 1977);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 546.800-.820 (Vernon, Supp.
1978); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 95-2306 to -2307 (1969); NEV. Ray. STAT. §§ 176.465
to -.475 (1973 & Supl. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1010-1011 (West, 1958 &
Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE § 16-3-27 (Law Co-op, Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-
918 (Michie, 1977). See also National Coalition Against the Death Penalty, Roster of
Death-Row Population and Death Penalty-Laws by Jurisdiction at April 15, 1978 (on
file at MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW), updated by Telephone Interview with Henry
Schwarzschild, National Coalition Against the Death Penalty (Oct. 31, 1978). Even
if such laws were not in existence, it is unlikely that a pregnant woman would be
executed. Of 3,860 persons put to death since 1930, only 32 have been female. U.S. LAw
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
Tics-1975, 712 (1976). A literature search reveals no information on how many of
these women were pregnant at execution, nor how many pregnant females were ini-
tially placed on death row by the courts. Due to the significant amount of time between
imposition of a death sentence and execution, however, a pregnant woman entering
death row would undoubtedly come to term before the sentence was carried out. See,
e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1977, 191 (98th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]
(median elapsed time under sentences of death over three years).
Nineteen of the thirty-two death penalty states have provisions regarding the
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letter has carried the attempt to restrict the Covenant's impact too
far. Such a proposal does a disservice to the United States and its
commitment to human rights by suggesting that this nation needs to
stand before the world community and assert its right to execute
imposition of capital punishment on juveniles. Four of those specifically prohibit the
infliction of the death penalty on those under either 16, 17, or 18 years old. See CAL.
PENAL ConE § 190.5 (West, Supp. 1978); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.025 (1973 & Supp.
1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2404(h)(i)(1) (Supp. 1977); TEX. PENAL CODE tit. 1 §
807(d) (Vernon, Supp. 1978). Thirteen others make youth a mitigating circumstance
in determining punishment. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(f)(1) (West, Supp.
1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(g) (West, Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
9-1(b) (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.025(b)(8) (Baldwin,
1977); LA. CODE CIUM. PRO. art. 905.5(f) (West, Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
134(b)(2) (Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012(3)(7) (Vernon, Supp. 1978); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(d) (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (Michie, 1978);
18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 1311(d)(2)(i) (Purdon, Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
3-207(I)(e) (Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.32.045(2)(g) (Supp. 1978); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 6-4-102(j)(vii) (1977).
Figures relating to the execution of juveniles, like those for pregnant women, are
relatively scarce. It appears that of 444 prisoners on death row as of December 31, 1976,
twenty were under twenty years of age. STATISTicAL ABsTRAcr, supra at 190. Only one
adult male has been executed in the United States since 1967, N.Y. Times, March 16,
1976, at 22, col. 1; U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NPS BULL. No.
46, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-70, at 1, 4 n.2 (1971).
Since the death penalty is so rarely imposed, particularly on women and juveniles,
it is extremely doubtful that the United States would ever make use of the proposed
reservation concerning capital punishment. The federal government is itself consider-
ing a death penalty bill which would prohibit infliction of the death penalty on a
pregnant woman and make the youth of the defendant a mitigating factor. See Hearing
on S. 1382 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1977).
Each state in the United States that allows capital punishment also has a provi-
sion for pardon. See ALA. CONST. amend. 38; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 18; CAL. CONST. art.
7, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. 4, § 7; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-26 (West, 1975); DEL.
CONST. art. 7, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 8; GA. CONST. art. 4, § 2-2001; IDAHO CONST.
art. 4, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. 5, § 12; INn. CONST. art. 5, § 17; Ky. CONST. § 77; LA. CONST.
art. 4, § 5(E); MD. CONST. art. 2, § 20; Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 124; Mo. CONST. art. 4, §
7, MONT. CONST. art. 6, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 13; NEv. CONST. art. 3, § 6;
N.C. CONST. art. 3, § 5(6); OKLA. CONST. art. 6, § 10; PA. CONST. art. 4, § 9; R.I. CONST.
amend. 2; S.C. CONST. art 4, § 14; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3505 (Supp. 1977); TEX.
CONST. art. 4, § 11; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-62-2 (Supp. 1977); VA. CONST. art. 5, § 12;
WASH. CONST. art. 3, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. 4, § 5.
It is more difficult at this time to conclude how great an effect the Covenant's
limitation of the death penalty to the "most serious crimes" might have on United
States practices. The United States Supreme Court has determined, however, that
under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment some crimes
are not of sufficient gravity to deserve capital punishment. See Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (Court held imposition of the death penalty for the offense of rape
unconstitutional). United States law under the eighth amendment may, therefore, be
in accord with the Covenant's reservation of the death penalty for only the most serious




children and pregnant women. Similarly, there appears to be no good
reason to refuse to guarantee the availability of pardon or prevent the
imposition of capital punishment for non-serious crimes.
E. REPEALED PENALTIES
Article 15 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides
in pertinent part: "If, subsequent to the commission of [a criminal]
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter pen-
alty, the offender shall benefit thereby." '' The February 23rd letter
states that such a humane practice is followed in many United States
jurisdictions. 12 Yet, the letter proposes a reservation making that
provision of the Covenant inapplicable."' If such a practice is fre-
quently followed, 2 1 such a reservation appears unnecessary and can
be explained as merely another effort to ensure that the Covenant
has no impact in the United States.
211. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 15, para. 1.
212. See Message, supra note 6, at XII.
213. Id.
214. As a general matter, it may be the case that parole boards consider a newly
enacted mitigating punishment in their determination whether a prisoner should be
released from confinement. The same lighter penalty principle does not appear to hold
true, however, where the courts and the legislatures are concerned. In the absence of
specific statutory provision to the contrary, the defendant is ordinarily sentenced
under the law prevailing at the time of the offense. See, e.g., P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d
837, 841 (Alaska 1972); Wildie v. State, 326 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. App. 1976); Dowdell
v. State, 336 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ind. App. 1975); State v. Allen, 82 N.M. 373, 374, 482
P.2d 237, 238 (1971); ALAsKA STAT. § 01.05.021(b) (1972); ARz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 1-
246 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-103 to -104 (1976). Where the law prescribing a
sentence is amended or repealed to establish a lesser penalty after final adjudication
of defendant's conviction, the original sentence will usually be sustained. See, e.g.,
Colvin v. Estelle, 506 F.2d 747, 748 (5th Cir. 1975); Way v. Super. Ct., 74 Cal. App.
3d 165, 179-80, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383, 392-93 (1977); People v. Covington, 29 Ill. App. 3d
580, 331 N.E.2d 283, 284 (1975); People v. Osteen, 46 Mich. App. 409, 414, 208 N.W.2d
198, 199 (1973); Lampley v. State, 308 So. 2d 87, 89-90 (Miss. 1975); People v. Allen,
51 A.D. 2d 748, 379 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1976); State v. Williams, 286 N.C. 422, 427-34, 212
S.E.2d 113-119 (1975); 1 U.S.C. § 29 (1970); CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1(t) (West,
Supp. 1978); MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 4, § 6 (Michie, 1973). Even if the lighter penalty
is enacted while a prosecution is still pending, many states nevertheless impose the
heavier penalty of the repealed law. See, e.g., United States v. Vallejo, 476 F.2d 667,
670 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830, (1974); United States v. Tillman, 467
F.2d 645, 646 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Fiore, 467 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973); FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 9; ALA. CODE tit. 1, § 1-1-12
(Supp. 1977); COLO. Rrv. STAT. § 2-4-303 (Cum. Supp. 1976); but see Shook v. Dist.
Ct., 533 P.2d 41, 42 (Colo. 1975) (mitigation prior to final appeal); People v. Williams,
60 IIl. 2d 1, 16-17, 322 N.E.2d 819, 827 (1975) (mitigation prior to final appeal).
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F. COMPENSATION FOR UNLAWFUL ARREST OR DETENTION
Article 9, paragraph (5), of the Civil and Political Covenant pro-
vides: "Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or deten-
tion shall have an enforceable right to compensation. ''21 1
The February 23rd letter proposes a reservation to make that
paragraph inapplicable." ' Federal and state laws now provide for an
enforceable right to compensation against the officials responsible,
but not against their governmental unit.217 It would appear that the
United States already complies with Article 9, paragraph (5) and,
accordingly, this proposed reservation is unnecessary.
G. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROVISION
The February 23rd letter also recommends an "understanding"
to paragraph (7) of Article 14 of the Civil and Political Covenant,
that the prohibition on double jeopardy contained in paragraph (7)
is applicable only when the judgment of acquittal has been rendered
by a court of the same governmental unit, whether the Federal Gov-
emnment or a constituent unit, which is seeking a new trial for the
same cause."
'
At the outset, it is difficult to understand why the authors of the
215. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 9, para. 5.
216. Message, supra note 6, at XII.
217. Although the meaning of "arbitrary" arrest or detention under United Na-
tions' jurisprudence is unclear, see Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and Exile, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/826/Rev. 1 at 5-8 (1964), the
Federal Government has defined this term and has assured an adequate right of recov-
ery for unlawful arbitrary arrest and detention by federal and state officers.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 399 (1971), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging unlawful arrest by federal narcotics
agents stated a cause of action for damages arising under the Constitution. On remand,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that an arrest made in bad faith
and without probable cause would provide sufficient grounds for the award of such
damages. 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972). The courts have recognized a similar
right to damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1977), against
state officers acting under color of law. See Danner v. Moore, 306 F. Supp. 433, 435
(D.C. Pa. 1969); U.S. ex reL Brzozowski v. Randall, 281 F. Supp. 306, 311 (D.C. Pa.
1968); Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167, 185 (D.C. Cal. 1964); Selico v. Jack-
son, 201 F. Supp. 475, 478 (D.C. Cal. 1962). But cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-
80 (1976) (denying injunctive relief for alleged § 1983 civil rights violations by local
police).
These damage actions apply against state and federal officials only in their indi-
vidual capacities and not against the governments themselves. Hence, their scope may
not be as broad as that envisioned by art. 9, para. 5, of the Civil and Political Cove-
nant. Nevertheless, even if the difference in breadth was admitted to be a potential
problem, this alone would not justify the unconditional language of the February 23rd
reservation.
218. Message, supra note 6, at XII.
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February 23rd letter characterized this recommendation as an under-
standing rather than a reservation," 9 since it clearly limits the impact
of Article 14 instead of merely clarifying its meaning. More impor-
tantly, however, the proposed limitation appears to directly contra-
vene the language of Article 14, paragraph (7) of the Covenant which
states: "No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an
offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted
in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.","
This prohibition against double jeopardy obviously would apply to a
situation in which a person had been first tried in state court and
thereafter was prosecuted in federal court for the same offence, or vice
versa.
Successive prosecutions by different governmental units were
initially allowed in the United States because the fifth amendment's
double jeopardy clause had not yet been made applicable to the
States through the fourteenth amendment.22' Those decisions have
been severely criticized by both courts and commentators. m In a
1969 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the double
jeopardy prohibition is enforceable through the fourteenth amend-
ment.22 Hence, little remains to support the earlier interpretation
permitting successive state and federal prosecutions.24 As a matter
219. See Laws and Practices Concerning the Conclusion of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/3, at 131 (1952). See generally note 90, supra.
220. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 2, art. 14, para. 7.
221. The cases generally cited as primary statements of the doctrine are Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959), and Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-
37 (1959). See also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); Fox v. Ohio, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 410, 426 (1847).
222. See Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303, 1307 (1975) (Douglas, J.); Ab-
bate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 201 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Frumento,
563 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1977) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Millhouse
v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1256 (1978); Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 842-45 (8th
Cir. 1977) (Lay, J., concurring) and cases there cited; Franck, An International Lawyer
Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 1096, 1096-104 (1959); Grant, Successive
Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons; 4
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1, 6-8, 34-37 (1956); Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A
Study in the Frustration of Human Rights, 17 U. MIAM L. Rav. 306, 327-47 (1963).
223. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
224. A common argument for the continued viability of reprosecution by differ-
ent units of government emphasizes the dual sovereignty doctrine of United States v.
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1923):
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources,
capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory
.... Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its
peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state




of practice, prosecutors today generally avoid successive state and
federal prosecutions.2 Nevertheless, because the drafters of the Feb-
ruary 23rd letter wanted to assure that the Covenants changed noth-
ing in United States law, they recommended an "understanding" to
nullify the impact of Article 14.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although this Article does not analyze every proposed reserva-
tion in the February 23rd letter, it illustrates how misguided that
letter clearly is. Many of the proposed reservations or understandings
appear either trivial, unnecessary, violative of international law, or a
combination of the above.
It is difficult to understand what could have motivated the Feb-
ruary 23rd letter and its underlying documents. One can hypothesize
the existence of governmental lawyers so enthusiastic in the
"defense" of their client25 that they lost sight of the reasons for ratify-
ing the Covenants in the first place. Alternatively, the President's
letter may have been designed to ease ratification by attempting to
foresee difficulties that might arise and to confront them at the out-
set, thus placing the Administration in a position to argue that no
As Congress has made inroads through the commerce and spending powers into
subjects traditionally reserved for the states, the two sovereignties argument has begun
to appear strained. Most commentators agree, in addition, that the increased tendency
of courts to stress the importance of individual interests at the expense of institutional
considerations has severely eroded the foundation of this contention. See generally
Tarley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1977) (Lay, J., concurring); Brant,
Overruling Bartkus and Abbate: A New Standard for Double Jeopardy, 11 WAsHBURN
L.J. 188, 199 (1972); Fisher, Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN. L. REv. 607,
610-20 (1966); Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv.
1309, 1329-31 (1932); Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy: A Critique of
Barthus v. Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 CASE W. REs. L. Rev. 700, 712-23
(1963); Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy: Waller and Ashe,
58 CALIF. L. REv. 391, 398-404 (1970); Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal
Governments, Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 HAEv. L. REv. 1538, 1544-65 (1967).
But see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317-23, 328 (1978) (dual sovereignty
theory permits successive prosecutions by Indian tribe and federal government).
225. The Department of Justice has a policy against duplicating a state prosecu-
tion. See, e.g., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960). It has announced as
a general procedure "that several offenses arising out of a single transaction should be
alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple prosecutions,
a policy dictated by considerations both of fairness to defendants and of efficient and
orderly law enforcement." Id. at 530; but see Note, 14 WAKE FOREST L. Rev. 823, 824-
25 (1978) (federal policy inconsistently applied).
226. A similar phenomenon has been noted in a related context. See Review of
the United Nation 33D Commission on Human Rights, Hearing before Subcomm. on
International Organizations of House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 20 (1977).
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further constitutional or legal impediments exist to ratification by
the United States.
By offering such an extensive and intensive set of reservations to
the Covenants, however, those who drafted these proposals may have
undermined the basic purpose of ratifying the treaties: encouraging
the implementation of human rights throughout the world. The pro-
posed reservations may counter-productively and paradoxically focus
attention on the difficulties with the Covenants rather than the bene-
fits of ratification.
The Administration, moreover, may have committed a costly
tactical error in proposing so many reservations, understandings, and
declarations without waiting to hear the concerns of the Senate. As
debate over the Covenants intensifies, the Administration may dis-
cover, to its chagrin, that it gave away all its bargaining chips in the
February 23rd letter before the serious discussion actually began.
